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This research asked the following question:  is there a correlation between types 
of organizational culture and factors influencing knowledge transfer?  It hypothesized 
that organizations scoring high on the cultural factors of openness to change/innovation, 
and task-oriented organizational growth would be fertile to knowledge transfer.  Second, 
it hypothesized that organizations scoring high on the factors of bureaucratic and 
competition/confrontation would be infertile to knowledge transfer.   
The research looked at Air Force squadrons, surveying a representative sample of 
the 1,495 active-duty squadrons included in the study with a 62- item, 5-point Likert-type 
instrument.  Overall, 51 squadrons were surveyed, and 22 produced usable results.  Both 
squadron and individual results were analyzed—and both were similar. 
Squadron results showed that organizations scoring high on the factors of 
openness to change/innovation and task-oriented organizational growth appeared to score 
consistently high on three of the four measures of fertility to knowledge transfer.  
Organizations scoring high on the factors of competition/confrontation appeared to score 
consistently low on three of the four measures of fertility to knowledge transfer.  The 
factor bureaucratic produced no significant correlations.  In every case, the measure of 
fertility to knowledge transfer known as partner similarity did not behave as expected. 
The research concluded that there appears to be a correlation between 
organizational culture and factors influencing the transfer of knowledge, but concludes 
that the factors influencing the transfer of knowledge should be further explored, and a 




AN INVESTIGATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE 
KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER IN THE AIR FORCE 
I.  Introduction 
One might make the claim that an organization’s knowledge is one of its most 
important resources.  In fact, numerous authors have pointed to knowledge as an 
organization’s best sustainable source of competitive advantage (Drucker 1988; Nonaka, 
1991; Morey and Frangioso, 1997; Zwass, 1999; Argote and Ingram, 2000; Argote, 
Ingram, Levine, and Moreland, 2000; Davenport and Prusak, 2000; Lahti and Beyerlein, 
2000; Rulke, Zaheer and Anderson, 2000).  Recent academic and popular media attention 
on organizational knowledge creation, capture, and transfer attest to a widespread 
acceptance of this idea (Costa, 1999; Davenport, DeLong, and Beers, 1998; Marchand 
and Davenport, 2000). 
If knowledge is indeed as important as some argue it is, perhaps an organization 
might wish to increase its use of the knowledge it already possesses.  One interim step 
towards realizing this goal is to identify factors that encourage or discourage knowledge 
transfer in organizations, and explain their interactions.  Once knowledge transfer is 
understood in the context of an organization, managers may begin to better plan to 
increase the use of knowledge in their organizations. 
Background 
Recently, with the realization of the importance of “knowledge organizations,” 
and “learning organizations,” organizations have begun looking at how to increase 
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organizational knowledge to gain a strategic advantage (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; 
Bresman, Birkinshaw, and Nobel, 1999; Davenport and Prusak 2000).  Thus far, interest 
has centered on knowledge creation and codification, primarily for two reasons.  First, the 
idea that a competitive advantage stems from new inventions and innovations has led to 
interest in knowledge creation (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).  Second, a recently 
competitive job market for technology professionals coupled with an aging technical 
workforce has led to numerous attempts to codify and capture knowledge before it leaves 
an organization in the minds of the employees (Rueve, 2000).   
In these regards, the Air Force is no different from its civilian counterparts.  Not 
only must it fill numerous technical positions to operate its current weapons systems, but 
it must also fill research and development positions to create future weapons systems 
(Norman, 2000).  Recent correspondence within Air Force channels has noted that, not 
only is the current workforce aging, but also the organization is having an increasingly 
difficult time recruiting and retaining a competent workforce (Norman, 2000; Ryan, 
2000, 2001). 
Complicating the above problems is the apparent failure of many early knowledge 
management efforts—at great cost in some cases (Davenport, DeLong and Beers, 1998).  
Some authors have argued one of the main reasons for this failure is that many 
knowledge management efforts treated knowledge either as no different from information 
and data, or as an asset that could be generated, codified, and transferred with essentially 
no friction (Von Hippel, 1994; Pan and Scarbrough, 1999; Szulanski, 2000).  Many 
authors note that a mismatch between a knowledge project’s goals and organizational 
culture might be a major friction reducing the effectiveness of knowledge projects 
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(Davenport, DeLong, and Beers, 1998; Kostova, 1999; Pan and Scarbrough, 1999; 
Davenport and Prusak, 2000; Marchand and Davenport, 2000; King, 2001); indeed, some 
even name it as the “biggest obstacle” (Costa, 1999).  In spite of this, however, no 
research was found investigating any relationship between the constructs of knowledge 
transfer and organizational culture. 
At the same time, researchers and practitioners alike have begun to understand 
that knowledge transfer within an organization might represent a lower-cost alternative to 
the creation, codification and capture of new knowledge.  One practitioner put it this way, 
“We used to say knowledge is power.  Now we say sharing is power.”  (Miller from 
Pederson, 1998b:20)  In this respect, how can a company increase its use of the 
knowledge it already contains?  Increased use of knowledge might create the benefits of 
increased organizational knowledge without having to expend the energy or cost 
associated with creating, codifying, or capturing more knowledge.   
Clearly, knowledge management is a powerful tool.  Increasing the amount of 
knowledge transferred within an organization has the potential to save an organization’s 
money while positioning it better to face future challenges; however, organizational 
culture is a strong force—one that may hinder the implementation of knowledge 
management in an organization.  Specifically, organizational culture may affect an 
organization’s ability to transfer knowledge because that culture may encourage 
individuals to either resist searching out and receiving knowledge or to resist efforts to 




As shown earlier, it appears that successful knowledge management efforts may 
be critical to the long-term success of an organization.  Also shown earlier, many recent 
knowledge management efforts have failed, and organizational culture may be to blame.  
Considering this, one might argue it is worthwhile to study the correlation between 
knowledge transfer and organizational culture; however, to date, there does not appear to 
be any research into an interaction between these two constructs. 
Research Question 
This research asks the following question:  is there a correlation between types of 
organizational culture and factors influencing knowledge transfer? 
Significance of this Study 
In the short-term, the ability to identify an organization as “fertile” or “infertile” 
to the transfer of knowledge will allow the management of an organization to determine 
whether it is worth their time, energy, and assets to invest in sometimes costly knowledge 
management efforts.  This research parallels that done to determine the initial success of 
information technology efforts based on organizational culture variables (Leonard-Barton 
and Deschamps, 1998; Hoffman and Klepper, 2000), but expands the scope to knowledge 
management efforts—which often include major management change efforts in addition 
to the information technology efforts (Davenport and Prusak, 2000).  Additionally, in the 
long-term, it will show management what environmental factors they might be able to 
manipulate to change an organization’s culture over the long-term—to begin to “grow” 
an organization that is predisposed to knowledge transfer. 
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Scope and Assumptions 
Within the knowledge management domain, this research is limited to the 
construct of knowledge transfer, and the factors that facilitate or hinder knowledge 
transfer from the perspective of the individual sender and the receiver.  Within the 
management and sociology domains, this research is limited to the construct of 
organizational culture, the different types of organizational cultures, and the indicators of 
organizational culture.  This research is limited to investigating whether or not a 
correlational relationship exists between the operationalized variables shown in the 
literature to represent the constructs of knowledge transfer and organizational culture; 
causality is not investigated.  Finally, both the study and implications of this research are 
limited in application to United States Air Force (hereafter called Air Force) units and 
personnel. 
Thesis Structure  
The next chapter investigates the constructs of knowledge transfer and 
organizational culture.  It pays specific attention to the interaction between knowledge 
transfer and organizational culture, and formulates specific hypotheses as to their 
interaction.  Chapter three describes the research methodology developed to measure the 
constructs of knowledge transfer and organizational culture, and their interaction.  
Chapter four describes the results of the research performed to investigate the relationship 
between knowledge transfer and organizational culture, noting which hypotheses were 
supported and which hypotheses were not supported.  Finally, chapter five discusses 
conclusions drawn from the research, limitations of the current study, and directions for 
future research in this area. 
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II.  Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter contains three sections:  “knowledge,” “organizational culture,” and 
“knowledge and organizational culture.”  The first section explores the definition of 
knowledge, with an explanation of the complexity of the concept and its importance to an 
organization’s sustained performance.  Next, the discipline of knowledge management is 
explained, with an overview given of its purpose within the context of an organization.  
Finally, knowledge transfer is explored as a sub-discipline of knowledge management, 
with an investigation of the known factors influencing knowledge transfer.   
The second section explores the definition of organizational culture, explaining 
the complexity of the concept.  Next, the importance of organizational culture to an 
organization’s sustained performance is explained.  Finally, the different types of 
organizational culture are explored. 
Within the knowledge and organizational culture section, the link between 
knowledge transfer—an individual phenomenon, and organizational culture—a group 
phenomenon, is explained.  The issue is first put in context by explaining the concept of 
organizational economics, with specific attention paid to the two major propositions of 
organizational economics:  agency theory, and transaction cost economics.  Next, the 
constructs of knowledge transfer and organizational economics are evaluated in the 
context of organizational economics to define the terms “fertile” and “infertile” with 
respect to knowledge transfer.  Finally, the constructs of knowledge transfer and 





The question, “what is knowledge,” is not new to humanity.  In the realm of 
philosophy, the study of knowledge has its own name, epistemology:  one of the four 
core questions (unanswered) facing humanity (Sober, 1991).  In epistemology, the 
traditionally accepted definition, attributed to Socrates and Plato, is that knowledge is a 
“justified true belief.”  (Sober, 1991:142)  This definition, though it enjoys wide 
distribution, does not enjoy wide acceptance (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).  
Additionally, this definition fails to address some important aspects of knowledge critical 
to a thorough understanding of its relevance to business.  Unfortunately, many business-
oriented definitions of knowledge fail to satisfy some of the basic philosophical 
implications of their use.  Therefore, quite unsurprisingly, there still exists considerable 
divergence in the definition of knowledge (Spiegler, 2000).  With a complete 
understanding that any research is dependent upon premises as well as argumentation, it 
is important to begin with a definition of knowledge that is both philosophically sound 
and useful to practitioners. 
To converge on a useful definition of knowledge, it is important to first discuss 
what it is not, or more accurately what it is not only.  According to much current 
literature, knowledge is not information, nor is it data, but it is comprised of them both 
(Tuomi, 1999; Spiegler, 2000; Davenport and Prusak, 2000).  Data is commonly defined 
as facts at the atomic level, devoid of both structure and context, or stripped of previously 
existing structure and context (Tuomi, 1999).  Information is commonly defined as data 
endowed with meaningful structures (Tuomi, 1999).  Knowledge, on the other hand, is 
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information endowed with context (Tuomi, 1999).  Therefore, knowledge, while being 
comprised of data or information, is something more.  Additionally, many definitions of 
knowledge add that it must be in the mind of a human (Polanyi, 1958; Davenport and 
Prusak, 2000).  In other words, whereas a computer can store and transmit both data and 
information, only a human can store and transmit knowledge. 
Another view of knowledge sees it as either explicit or tacit.  First described by 
Michael Polanyi (1958) in his book, Personal Knowledge, and further defined in his 
(1966) book The Tacit Dimension, explicit knowledge is knowledge that can be 
explained, whereas tacit knowledge cannot be explained.  This distinction will become 
important in the forthcoming discussion of knowledge transfer, but it is important to note 
that it is not a mutually exclusive distinction; rather, it is helpful to view the explicit-tacit 
distinction as a continuum.  Both Polanyi (1966), and more recently, Ikujiro Nonaka and 
Hirotaka Takeuchi (1995) in their book, The Knowledge Creating Company, point out 
that knowledge may be either explicit or tacit or a combination of the two.  Further, 
knowledge may become either more tacit or more explicit as an individual learns or is 
better able to articulate what is in his or her head (Polanyi, 1966; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995). 
Finally, it is useful to understand the personal nature of knowledge.  In fact, 
Polanyi (1966) described all knowledge as inherently personal.  The way he described it, 
all knowledge in fact has a tacit component when it resides in the mind of a person.  
Therefore, he argued, when transferring this knowledge from one person to another, the 
knowledge changes in the sense that the other individual must interpret the knowledge in 
the context of his or her own person.  In fact, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), using this 
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same framework, argue that the traditional philosophical definition of knowledge as a 
justified true belief becomes irrelevant in practice because knowledge means different 
things to different people.  They argue for a revised definition, “Knowledge [is] a 
dynamic human process of justifying personal belief toward the ‘truth’ (Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995:58).” 
Therefore, to be considered useful to an organization, a representative definition 
of knowledge must include three concepts:  first, it must point out that knowledge is more 
than data or information; second, it must describe the tacit or explicit nature of 
knowledge; third, it must describe the personal nature of knowledge.  Davenport and 
Prusak offer the following definition: 
Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, and 
expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new 
experiences and information.  It originates and is applied in the minds of knowers.  In 
organizations, it often becomes embedded not only in documents or repositories but 
also in organizational routines, processes, practices, and norms.  (Davenport and 
Prusak, 2000:5) 
 Though the above definition is somewhat wordy, it encompasses all the 
important qualities of knowledge of interest to an organization defined above; therefore, 
this definition of knowledge is adopted for the purposes of this study.  As will be shown, 
this definition contains key components of organizational cultures:  mixed experience, 
values, and a framework for evaluating an incorporating new experiences and 
information, and embedded within routines, processes, practices and norms, and hence is 




One question arising from the previous description of knowledge is, “how can it 
be managed?”  Clearly, knowledge is a complicated, and intensely personal phenomenon 
and any attempt to manage it will be complicated as well.  Perhaps this leads to another 
legitimate question, “why would an organization even want to manage the knowledge in 
its employees?”  For a long time, most organizations answered these questions by saying, 
essentially, “not only can knowledge not be managed, but even if it could be we would 
not want to.”  Indeed, most organizations were content to simply manage their data and 
information—both of which are more easily stored and transferred using modern data and 
information processing systems (Drucker, 1988). 
However, the data and information management paradigm led to three unintended 
consequences.  First, as both data and information stores began to fill up, and became 
interconnected, the realization came that there was probably more data and information 
than it was possible to interpret.  This is commonly called “information overload.”  
(Davenport and Prusak, 2000:xiv)  Second, as companies downsized in the latter decades 
of the Twentieth Century, they relied on their data and information stores to maintain a 
competitive market edge, while viewing their employees as expendable capital (Womack, 
Jones, and Roos, 1990).  Last, the increased investments in information apparently 
provided little or no business benefit, defined in the literature as the “productivity 
paradox.” (Brynjolfsson, 1993; Kolekofski, 1997)  These interconnected consequences 
led to organizations that were less flexible than before.  In other words, the original 
knowledge that created systems and processes was gone, but the systems and processes 
remained—in some cases representing significant investments.  Effectively, this forced 
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organizations to do business the same way as 10 or 20 years previous, with processes that 
did not exploit current technology, without knowing exactly why. 
In the midst of the confusion, a few voices began to call for a new paradigm.  
Instead of worshipping at the false idols of data and information, the new standard for 
measuring worth in a corporation would be knowledge, and its corollary, learning. 
A learning organization is an organization skilled at creating, acquiring, and 
transferring knowledge, and at modifying its behavior to reflect new knowledge and 
insights.  (Garvin, 1998:51) 
This definition is echoed in Davenport and Prusak’s (2000) book, Working Knowledge.  
This text defines the three main components of knowledge management as:  knowledge 
generation, knowledge codification and coordination, and knowledge transfer (Davenport 
and Prusak, 2000).  Delving into the two definitions offered above, it is possible to 
consolidate them into a combined definition of components:   
1)  Creation, Generation, and Acquisition of New Knowledge 
2)  Codification and Coordination of Knowledge 
3)  Transfer of Knowledge (includes absorption and modification of behavior) 
As described in Chapter 1, the main emphasis in business has been on the second 
component, codification and coordination of knowledge—making tacit knowledge more 
explicit.  Research into expert systems abounded, at significant cost (Odom and Dorr, 
1995).  Quite secondarily, significant efforts at the first component, creation, generation, 
and acquisition of new knowledge, abounded (Leonard-Barton, 1995; Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995).  Perhaps unfortunately, the discipline of knowledge transfer was de-
emphasized in favor of the other two.  Evidence of the problems business now faces 
because of this decision abounds in the popular media, with perhaps the most frequent 
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mention made of situations involving consultants and outsourcing arrangements  (Chien-
Ai, 1991; Horwitt, 1996; Anonymous, 1998; Pederson, 1998a; Kerr, 1998). 
Knowledge Transfer 
As described above, knowledge transfer is just one of three aspects of knowledge 
management—one that has perhaps received the least attention of the three in recent 
years.  In individual psychology, however, the study of knowledge transfer predates the 
study of knowledge management by several decades (Argote, Ingram, Levine, and 
Moreland, 2000).  Indeed, the concept that knowledge transfer represents not only a 
competitive advantage within a firm, but that it represents a less expensive alternative to 
knowledge creation and acquisition is well documented in economics literature: 
. . . Opportunities for profitable team production by inputs already within the firm 
may be ascertained more economically and accurately than for resources outside the 
firm.  Superior combinations of inputs can be more economically identified and 
formed from resources already used in the organization than by obtaining new 
resources (and knowledge of them) from the outside. . . .  Efficient production with 
heterogeneous resources is a result not of having better resources but in knowing 
more accurately the relative productive performances of those resources.  (Alchian 
and Demsetz, 1972:793) 
Interestingly, this concept recently gained attention in organizational behavior literature 
as well (Argote and Ingram, 2000). 
One of the phenomena related to knowledge is that, “unlike material assets, which 
decrease as they are used, knowledge assets increase with use:  ideas breed new ideas, 
and shared knowledge stays with the giver while it enriches the receiver.”  (Davenport & 
Prusak, 2000:17)  Knowledge transfer, then, is a corollary to knowledge creation.  Once 
knowledge is created, it acts as an economy of scale as it is shared—both because more 
than one individual can use knowledge at the same time, and because shared knowledge 
 
13 
stimulates the creation of new knowledge.  Further, knowledge transfer appears to reduce 
overall organizational costs by preventing a second group of individuals from repeating 
the mistakes of a first group of individuals (Gruenfeld, Martorana, and Fan).  In fact, it 
appears that increased knowledge transfer contributes to overall organizational success 
(Baum and Ingram, 1998).  For these reasons, it should be apparent that knowledge 
transfer is every bit as important as knowledge generation—perhaps even more so if one 
considers overall organizational costs.   
The theory of knowledge transfer assumes the knowledge to be transferred 
already exists (i.e., is separate from knowledge creation—even though the two are 
related).  Knowledge transfer is concerned with the two-step process of moving it from 
one individual to another, though some sources talk to the ability to aggregate these 
transfers at the organizational level (Mahler, 1997).  To achieve transmission, the 
knowledge must first be transmitted by the knowledge sender, and then absorbed by the 
knowledge receiver (Davenport & Prusak, 2000:101).  If this sounds familiar, it is 
because this is an extension of communication theory (Gibson, Ivancevich & Donnely, 
1997:424).  Within the domain of knowledge management, however, a further dimension 
is added to the concept of knowledge transfer.  Knowledge, once received, must then be 
used to be considered useful to an organization (Davenport and Prusak, 2000:101).   
Previous literature has shown numerous examples of organizations successful at 
the transfer of knowledge (Zairi and Whymark, 2000), but most offer little insight into 
how those companies became successful.  To fully understand how to “grow” knowledge 
transfer capability, it is first important to understand what factors tend to affect 
knowledge transfer.  According to the literature, knowledge transfer may often be 
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influenced by environmental factors (Marchand and Davenport, 2000; Davenport and 
Prusak, 2000), also termed “frictions,” but again, the extent to which it is influenced is 
incompletely explored in previous literature.  It is to this issue we now turn. 
Factors Affecting Knowledge Transfer 
We now explore in detail the various frictions that might influence successful 
transfer of knowledge in an organization.  Davenport and Prusak note the following:  
Many knowledge initiatives have been based on the utopian assumption that 
knowledge moves without fric tion or motivating force, that people will share 
knowledge with no concern for what they may gain or lose by doing so.  (Davenport 
and Prusak, 2000:26) 
From the above analyses of the intensely personal nature of knowledge and the failure of 
so many recent knowledge management efforts, it appears the assumption they refer to 
proves untrue; however, to fully understand why this assumption proves untrue, we must 
examine those factors that might influence knowledge transfer. 
Kitchen (1999) pointed to four factors that might influence information transfer:  
personal, interpersonal, architectural, and administrative.  A more recent literature review 
within the knowledge domain provided the following five factors that might influence 
knowledge transfer:  relational channels (Rulke, Zaheer, and Anderson, 2000), partner 
similarity (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Darr and Kurtzberg, 2000), depreciation (Argote, 
Beckman, and Epple, 1990; Darr, Argote and Epple, 1995), organizational self-
knowledge (Rulke, Zaheer, and Anderson, 2000), and divergence of interests (Alchian 
and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Donaldson, 1990).   
As shown in Figure 1, the factors influencing information transfer and those 
influencing knowledge transfer appear to overlap.  This is somewhat unsurprising, 
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considering both types of transfer occur in the same context, within the same 















Figure 1:  Comparison of Information Transfer and Knowledge Transfer 
Factor 1:  Relational Channels 
First, as examined earlier, the quality of the knowledge to be transferred (tacit 
versus explicit) affects knowledge transfer (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).  Specifically, 
the more tacit the knowledge is, the more difficult it will be to transfer that knowledge.  
However, if all knowledge has a tacit component, as Polanyi argues it does, then some 
form of relational channel, defined broadly as two-way human-to-human contact, is 
necessary to transfer knowledge effectively.  If this is the case, it is possible to argue that 
the tacit-explicit continuum becomes less relevant, as the true predictor of knowledge 
transfer success becomes whether the channel chosen for transfer is relational (Morey and 
Frangioso, 1997; Rulke, Zaheer, and Anderson, 2000).  Instead, the degree to which 
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knowledge is tacit, in concert with the richness of communication channels, appears only 
to affect the speed by which knowledge is diffused (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Cisse, 
2001).  Finally, relational channels only appear to increase transfer of knowledge on the 
individual level; a group face-to-face discussion may in fact reduce overall pooling of 
information (Stasser, Vaughan, and Stewart, 2000). 
Factor 2:  Partner Similarity 
Second, one might imagine that, much like the tacit-explicit continuum, the 
complexity of the knowledge to be transferred influences its transfer.  In fact, it is more 
likely that the similarity of individuals attempting the transfer will influence the transfer 
(Almeida and Kogut, 1999).  Further examination shows this a reasonable explanation, as 
to individuals with similar interests, backgrounds, or educations, complexity begins to 
seem a relative term.  In fact, a recent study showed partner similarity to be a strong 
predictor of knowledge transfer between organizations—especially strategic similarity 
(Darr and Kurtzberg, 2000). 
Factor 3:  Depreciation 
Third, if we accept the definition of “transfer plus absorption,” it is clear that 
“depreciation” of knowledge transferred—defined as loss of knowledge after it is 
transferred—affects knowledge transfer success (Argote, Beckman, and Epple, 1990; 
Darr, Argote and Epple, 1995).  However, depreciation becomes less explanatory as the 
effects of turnover are accounted for, and is therefore removed from the subsequent 
discussions. 
Factor 4:  Organizational Self-Knowledge 
Fourth, the concept of organizational self-knowledge refers to the degree to which 
individuals have knowledge of what they as individuals know, and likewise for those 
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individuals surrounding them.  It is a key prerequisite to knowledge transfer because 
without this self-knowledge, the knowledge sender and receiver will most likely never 
meet to make a transfer (Moreland and Myaskovsky, 2000; Rulke, Zaheer, and Anderson, 
2000). 
Factor 5:  Divergence of Interests 
Fifth, it seems clear that any breakdown on the part of the sender or receiver of 
the knowledge to be transferred with respect to the will to transfer the knowledge will 
preclude the occurrence of a knowledge transfer.  It has been established that individual 
interests and organizational interests tend to diverge (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Donaldson, 1990).  For this reason, it seems apparent that market 
forces will work within an organization to influence the transfer of knowledge, and that 
divergence of interests will tend to inhibit knowledge transfer. 
As shown earlier, environmental factors, also called frictions, appear to influence 
the transfer of knowledge within an organization.  With the exception of depreciation, 
there appears to be one item shared in common between each of the four remaining 
frictions:  that of the influence of organizational culture.  Before explaining this 
commonality, though, it is necessary to answer the larger question of what the term 
“organizational culture” means, and its implications. 
Organizational Culture  
Organizational Culture Defined 
It is nearly axiomatic to state that values and beliefs exist at the individual level; 
numerous management and leadership texts speak to the diversity of values and beliefs 
existing in the minds of an organization’s personnel (Gibson, Ivancevich, and Donnelly, 
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1997; Yukl, 1998).  In fact, as explored earlier, values and beliefs are imbedded into 
individual knowledge.  One group of authors explains the importance of values in an 
organization:  “Values affect the perceptions not only of appropriate ends but also of 
appropriate means to those ends.”  (Gibson, Ivancevich, and Donnelly, 1997:105)  
Academics and practitioners alike agree that, to the leadership in an organization, 
therefore, it is imperative to attempt to understand individual values and beliefs as they 
relate to the job at hand because they will affect employees’ work performance (Ott, 
1989; Gibson, Ivancevich, and Donnelly, 1997; Anonymous, 2000).   
How much more important is it, then, to understand an organizations’ values and 
beliefs, if there is such an entity?  Understandably, if an organization’s members share a 
common set of values and beliefs, it might be easier for leadership to attempt to 
understand and make use of the shared values rather than each individuals’ values.   
From an organizational perspective, the collective values and beliefs of the 
individual members of that organization represent a phenomenon called, “organizational 
culture.”  Noted researcher Edgar Schein puts it this way: 
Culture can now be defined as (a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, 
discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems 
of external adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be 
considered valid and, therefore (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct 
way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.  (Schein, 1990:111) 
What Schein further points out is that an organization’s culture, much like values and 
beliefs at the individual level, is an anxiety reduction mechanism—a way to cope with 
uncertainty (Schein, 1990:111).  Much like a type of tacit knowledge, an organization’s 
culture resides not only in its written documents (called “artifacts”), but also in the minds 
of its individuals—affecting their perception and actions.  In fact, when one compares the 
 
19 
above definition to that of knowledge, presented earlier, it appears as though culture and 
knowledge are similar concepts, perhaps influenced by some of the same forces. 
One aspect of organizational culture that Schein leaves out of his definition, but 
mentions in explanation of it, is the fact that organization’s culture grows over a long 
period, and is unlikely to change quickly (Schein, 1990; Lundberg, 1996).  Because of 
this and other factors, Schein further notes that an organization measured at a point in 
time might not have any discernable culture, or even that organizational cultures might 
exist at numerous levels within an organization (Schein, 1990:111). 
An idea attributed to Schein, and expanded in J. Ott’s (1989) book, The 
Organizational Culture Perspective, is that there are three levels at which organizational 
culture resides, with each level more hidden than the previous.  These levels are 
artifacts/patterns of behavior, beliefs and values, and basic underlying assumptions (Ott, 
1989:54).  It is useful to explain these levels, as they are important to consider when one 
decides to measure (and how to measure) organizational culture. 
Artifacts/Patterns of Behavior 
The most obvious level of organizational culture, artifacts include, 
 “. . . Material and nonmaterial objects and patterns that intentionally or 
unintentionally communicate information about the organization’s technology, 
beliefs, values, assumptions, and ways of doing things.”  (Ott, 1989:24) 
Examples of artifacts include reports, operating instructions, and physical layout of office 
space, but also include language used in the workplace, including both jargon and 
metaphors, and may also include myths or organizational hero stories, sagas and legends, 
and even ceremonies and celebrations.  Artifacts are easier to measure than behaviors and 
values because they are often visible.  However, artifacts tend to give a researcher the 
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least insight into an organization’s culture (Ott, 1989), and may require qualitative 
techniques to identify and measure (Barclay and York, 1996).  Further, some argue a 
degree of caution is advisable to the researcher wishing to measure culture using artifacts 
as surrogates; after all, an organization’s espoused culture may not always coincide with 
their actual culture (Hawkins, 1997; Darrah, 1997). 
Sometimes harder to observe than artifacts, patterns of behavior are routine 
activities that “communicate information about the organization’s technology, beliefs, 
values, assumptions, and ways of doing things.”  (Ott, 1989:36)  Examples of patterns of 
behavior include rites and rituals, which differ from ceremonies in that they are habits 
that occur more often (e.g., daily), and behavioral norms, which represent a consensus of 
“the way things should be done around here.”  Behavior may prove a more reliable 
measure of culture than artifacts—perhaps because over time they are harder to “fake” 
(Hawkins, 1997).  Patterns of behavior may also be measured qualitatively, and there is 
evidence that attempting to measure them quantitatively produces misleading results (Ott, 
1989). 
Beliefs and Values 
“Beliefs are consciously held, cognitive (mental) views about truth and reality . . . 
values are conscious, affective (emotion- laden) desires or wants.”  (Ott, 1989:39)  
Examples of beliefs and values include ethical codes and ideologies.  Quite interestingly, 
it is difficult to infer values and beliefs from qualitative research, as they tend to resist 
direct observation (Ott, 1989).  Also interesting is that beliefs and values seem to avail 
themselves to quantitative techniques.  Though counterintuitive at first, this can be 
explained by the fact that values and beliefs are often consciously held—and therefore 
 
21 
react well to overt questioning (Ott, 1989).  This said, Ott (1989) qualifies his approval of 
quantitative measures by saying they will make little sense without the context provided 
by qualitative measures.  In his study, the beliefs and values questionnaire was most 
valuable in that it stimulated discussion that led to a more thorough understanding of the 
organization’s culture (Ott, 1989). 
Basic Underlying Assumptions 
Basic underlying assumptions are the aspects of individual (and organizational) 
personality that have grown over such a long time, and perhaps so subtly, as to be 
considered tacit.  Since underlying assumptions are seen as a tacit manifestation of 
organizational culture, Ott (1989) argues they tend to resist measurement by any 
technique, either qualitative or quantitative.  Unfortunately, this is also the level with 
which an organizational culture researcher holds the most interest, since presumably a 
shared organizational culture resides mostly at this level.   
Ott (1989) posits the best way to access this level of organizational culture is by 
way of proxy—measuring other levels as close to this level as possible, then making a 
logical inference as to the best explanation for the observations.  This is commonly called 
making an abductive inference (Sober, 1991).  Though one cannot argue with Ott’s 
conservative approach to measuring basic underlying assumptions, Polanyi (1966) gives 
hope for the quantitative researcher when he proposes: 
 . . . All our thought contains components of which we are subsidiarily aware in the 
focal content of our thinking, and that all thought dwells in its subsidiaries, as if they 
were parts of our body.  Hence, thinking is not only necessarily intentional . . . it is 
also necessarily fraught with the roots that it embodies.  (Polanyi, 1966:x) 
This statement indicates it may indeed be possible to measure an organization’s basic 
underlying assumptions, if one is cautious in his or her approach.  Indeed, many 
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quantitative survey instruments claim to do just this—reliably (Xenikou and Furnham, 
1996). 
The Importance of Organizational Culture 
As seen above, an organization’s culture is an important (if subconscious) guiding 
force in an organization.  It grows and remains stable over relatively long periods, and 
may exist at numerous different levels of an organization.  The stability of an 
organizational culture makes it a potentially powerful force within an organization.  One 
question that remains unanswered is whether organizational cultures are beneficial or 
detrimental forces in an organization. 
In her book, Wellsprings of Knowledge, Dorothy Leonard-Barton (1995) notes 
that shared values and norms of an organization represent one of its core capabilities.  
According to Leonard-Barton, core capabilities are those capabilities an organization has 
grown over time that it knows better than any other organization—and are therefore 
essential to its success (Leonard-Barton, 1995).  Shared values and norms are, therefore, 
a type of tacit organizational knowledge that incorporate years of learning how to best 
perform tasks.  When business remains stable, shared values and norms help a company 
gain a competitive advantage by avoiding the mistakes of the past, for example.  In many 
cases, they are shaped from the earliest days of an organization’s existence, and usually 
an organization retains some of its “personality” from the early days of its existence 
almost indefinitely (Leonard-Barton, 1995). 
However, Leonard-Barton (1995) also notes the following:  “every core capability 
is also inherently a core rigidity.”  By acknowledging that past successes and failures 
taint an organization’s perception of the present and future, it becomes evident that a 
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shared values and norms might lead to the following deleterious effects:  limited problem 
solving, sterile implementation/inability to innovate, limited experimentation, and most 
importantly, screening out new knowledge (Leonard-Barton, 1995; Levine, Higgins, and 
Choi, 2001).  Put another way, an organization’s culture may be seen as a link to a tacit 
power structure, grown over time; when the old power structure is threatened, “The 
resistance is subtle and covert—and it is often successful.”  (Kotter and Heskett, 1992:79) 
The above analysis shows organizational culture to be similar to the mythical 
Gemini—a two-faced being that can both help and hurt at the same time.  The important 
item to note is that organizational culture affects organizational performance—both 
overtly, through its influence over standards and behavior, and less overtly, through its 
influence over basic underlying assumptions.  It is now important to turn to the question 
of what types of organizational cultures have been identified.  Only through classifying 
an organization’s culture is it possible to begin to answer the question of whether that 
culture is “fertile” or “infertile” with respect to our construct of interest, knowledge 
transfer. 
Types of Organizational Culture 
Since the concept of organizational culture is derived from the concept of values 
and beliefs, it is should come as no surprise that there are as many different 
organizational cultures as there are organizations.  For example, in a multidimensional 
survey of 20 international units of IBM, every unit mean score was significantly different 
(Hofstede and Neuijen, 1990). 
This fact notwithstanding, a number of research efforts have identified distinct 
types of organizational culture that appear to explain most of the variance between 
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organizations—with each researcher using different terminologies and methods to 
describe a few seemingly similar concepts.  A recent study consolidated much of this 
research using a factor analysis (Xenikou and Furnham, 1996).  Because this study 
considered, and then summarized much of the major research over the past 20 years, it is 
explained here in some detail. 
The authors of this study identified six interdependent factors explaining just over 
seventy percent of the variance between four of the most common measures of 
organizational culture.  They also measured internal reliability of the measures to ensure 
the applicability of their results back to the original questionnaires (all of which were 
previously validated).  The six factors identified, hereafter referred to as types of 
organizational culture, are now discussed. 
Type 1:  Openness to Change/Innovation 
This organizational culture type groups the following concepts together:  
humanistic orientation, affiliation, achievement, self-actualization, task support, task 
innovation, and hands-on management (further defined as:  managers should not just 
plan, but participate) (Xenikou and Furnham, 1996:363).  They are explained as by the 
authors as follows: 
These concepts seem to stress openness to change, innovation, and achievement 
within a humanistic social environment where cooperation is highly valued and 
members are expected to be supportive and open to influence in their dealings with 
one another.  (Xenikou and Furnham, 1996:362). 
An organization scoring high on this factor might be considered “friendly,” and “open to 
change.”  Put negatively, one might call this an organization of “nosey neighbors.” 
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Type 2:  Task-Oriented Organizational Growth 
This organizational culture type groups the following concepts together:  being 
the best, innovation, attention to detail, quality orientation, profit orientation, and shared 
philosophy (Xenikou and Furnham, 1996:363).  The authors compare this to the “Kaisen” 
philosophy espoused by successful Japanese companies that stress cautious, incremental 
improvement.  An organization scoring high in this factor might be considered “task-
oriented” versus “people-oriented.”  Put negatively, one might call this an organization of 
“strivers,” or “impersonal.” 
Type 3:  Bureaucratic  
This organizational culture type groups the following concepts together:  
approval, conventionality, dependence, avoidance, and [lack of] personal freedom 
(Xenikou and Furnham, 1996:363).  The authors describe this culture as formal, with 
centralized decision-making.  An organization scoring high on this factor might be 
considered “conservative” or “prudent.”  Put negatively, one might call this an 
organization that is “passive,” or “defensive.” 
Type 4:  Artifacts 
This organizational culture type groups the following concepts together:  values, 
heroes, rituals, and cultural network (Xenikou and Furnham, 1996:363).  These items 
measure whether or not members of an organization recognize the concepts listed above 
as part of their culture.  For this reason, the authors make the point that this factor 
probably does not measure a type of organizational culture so much as it measures 
whether or not an organization has a strong culture.  An organization scoring high on this 
factor might be considered one that has a discernable culture.  An organization scoring 
low on this factor might be considered one that does not have a discernable culture.  
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Since this factor does not appear to prescribe any behavior, it is eliminated from the 
subsequent analysis and discussion of correlation with knowledge transfer. 
Type 5:  Competition/Confrontation 
This organizational culture type groups the following concepts together:  
oppositional orientation, power, competition, and perfectionism (Xenikou and Furnham, 
1996:363).  The authors describe this culture as one where perfection is the goal, and 
where individuals might tend to react negatively towards the ideas of others and/or resist 
new ideas.  An organization scoring high on this factor might be considered a 
“perfectionist” organization.  Put negatively, one might call this organization a “dog-eat-
dog” organization. 
Type 6:  Positive Relations 
This organizational culture type groups the following concepts together:  social 
relations, “work should be fun,” the value of people, and communication (Xenikou and 
Furnham, 1996:363).  The authors describe this culture as one where friendship with 
coworkers is encouraged, as are social activities and socializing.  An organization scoring 
high on this factor might be considered “a fun place to work,” or “a family environment.”  
Put negatively, one might call this organization, “lazy,” or “touchy-feely.”  While 
important to an organization, this particular item did not explain enough of the variance 
between the survey items mentioned and had significant overlap with the other factors 
(such as openness to change/innovation); therefore, it is eliminated from the subsequent 
analysis and discussion of correlation with knowledge transfer.  
Having outlined organizational culture, its importance, and the some of the more 
commonly measured types of organizational culture, we now may ask what specific types 
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of organizational culture might be identified as “fertile” or “infertile” with respect to 
knowledge transfer.  It is to this task we now turn. 
Knowledge Transfer and Organizational Culture  
Organizational Economics:  The Linking Mechanism  
The above analysis endeavored to make two points:  knowledge transfer is likely 
to be rife with friction, and organizational culture is a likely cause of individual action.  
However, the method of interaction between knowledge transfer and organizational 
culture is yet to be explained.  To begin this explanation, we begin by discussing 
“knowledge markets”—defined as a place (either physical or, more likely conceptual) 
where knowledge is transferred at a cost (Davenport and Prusak, 2000).  Knowledge 
markets affect knowledge transfer, through the costs associated with knowledge, and 
organizational culture influences an organization’s perception of, and actions in, 
knowledge markets.  With respect to knowledge markets, Davenport and Prusak note the 
following: 
. . . The only way to have a market that works well is, first of all, to recognize that 
market forces exist; second, to try to understand how it functions; and third, to make 
it more efficient.  (Davenport and Prusak, 2000) 
Already, this paper has alluded to the two key components of a management 
theory called “organizational economics”—an organizational concept that attempts to 
explain how market forces operate within organizations.  These two key components are:  
agency theory and transaction cost economics (Donaldson, 1990).  Understanding these 
components helps further explain the individual behavior one is likely to find in a 
knowledge market, as well as how organizational culture might affect knowledge transfer 




Agency theory states that many social relationships can be understood as 
interactions between two parties:  a principal and an agent.  “The principal(s) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent.”  (Jensen & Meckling, 1976)  
Since the interests of the principal and the agent are inclined to diverge, additional costs 
must be incurred (through monitoring and incentives) to ensure the agent acts in 
accordance with the principal; these costs are called agency costs.  Though the theory 
concentrates on individuals, it is easy to see that in an organization exhibiting a culture, 
each individual agent will be affected by that culture, to the extent that, an organizational 
culture represents the collected interests of multiple agents.  At its worst, an organization 
ignoring agency costs may turn into an “organizational anarchy” where management 
efforts become entirely ineffective in favor of individual market actions that have no 
relation to overall strategic goals (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972). 
In Donaldson’s (1990) analysis of organizational economics, he states an apparent 
contradiction that might resist the analysis of an organization’s individuals using a 
concept such as organizational culture.  He states that economics uses the concept of 
“methodological individualism”, which states, “social phenomena . . . should be analyzed 
as arising from conscious actions of individuals.”  (Donaldson, 1990:371)  However, he 
notes, “psychologists and sociologists point out that human behavior is often produced 
without conscious thought, that is, through habit, emotion, taken-for-granted custom, 
conditioned reflex, unconditioned reflex, posthypnotic suggestion, and unconscious 
desires.”  (Donaldson, 1990:372)  Though this analysis is somewhat tongue- in-cheek, it is 
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clear this contradiction must be cleared before any analysis is attempted of economic 
transactions within an organization—especially with regard to the collected interests of 
multiple agents. 
Though Donaldson may have been unaware of his writings, Polanyi (1966) 
answers this apparent contradiction with his explanation provided earlier of the 
interaction between the conscious and the subconscious; namely, that the subconscious is 
under the influence of the conscious.  Polanyi extends this explanation by stating: 
Any attempts to avoid the responsibility for shaping the beliefs which we accept as 
true is absurd; but the existentialist claim of choosing our beliefs from zero is now 
proved absurd too.  Thought can live only on grounds which we adopt in the service 
of a reality to which we submit.  (Polanyi, 1966:xi) 
In this statement, Polanyi opens the door to the possibility that organizational culture can 
affect an individual’s actions based on previous, conscious, socialization to that 
organizational culture, while at the same time an individual is still in conscious control of 
his or her own actions.  Put another way, since organizational culture, once accepted, 
influences perception, subsequent conscious actions may or may not be in the best 
interests of the principal—or even the individual agent, depending on the degree to which 
perception is influenced. 
As noted in the popular press, the inevitable difference in interests between a 
principal and an agent is of primary concern to ensuring the success of knowledge 
management efforts (Manchester, 2001).  With respect to knowledge transfer, then, it is 
possible to say that an organizational culture that is fertile for knowledge transfer will be 
one that recognizes and incorporates into its structure and understanding of knowledge 




Transaction cost economics refers to the problem inherent in economic 
transactions, namely that one party might not be inclined to give the other party the full 
value they “owe” (Donaldson, 1990) in a market transaction.  The concept rejects the 
assumption of simplified economics that buyers and sellers in a market are price-takers.  
Interestingly, this type of behavior is only possible in a market with incomplete 
information—exactly what some theorists posit about knowledge markets.  They argue 
that knowledge markets are often inefficient barter markets in which the worth of each 
side’s contribution is extremely hard to measure (Morey and Frangioso, 1997).  As one 
might imagine, the resulting opportunistic behavior is usually detrimental to overall 
organizational health. 
With respect to knowledge transfer, it is possible to say that an organization fertile 
for knowledge transfer is one in which endeavors to reduce ambiguity in the marketplace 
and hence, reduce transaction costs. 
Knowledge Transfer Factors and the Fertile Organizational Culture 
As shown earlier, knowledge transfer seems to be influenced by four factors:  
relational channels, partner similarity, organizational self-knowledge, and divergence of 
interests.  For each of these factors, an explanation is offered below as to the type of 
organizational culture (knowledge transfer fertile, or knowledge transfer infertile) that 
might be associated with those factors.  This section represents a theoretical bridge 
between the two theories of knowledge transfer and organizational culture, but is as of 





An organization with many relational channels for transferring knowledge might 
expect more knowledge to be transferred than one that has few, because transaction costs 
are likely to be reduced in an organization with many relationa l channels.  Relational 
channels are a measure of both the number and richness of communication channels.  In 
this case, it is likely that more relational channels represent more and varied sources of 
market information.  The more available market information is, the less likely transaction 
costs are to be incurred in a market transaction within an organization—to include a 
knowledge transfer.  For this reason, an organizational culture that fosters many relational 
channels for transferring knowledge might be considered a knowledge transfer fertile 
organizational culture. 
Partner Similarity 
An organization with many similar partners might expect more knowledge to be 
transferred than one that has few because both agency costs and transaction costs are 
likely to be reduced.  In an organization in which all members have similar backgrounds, 
education levels, and experiences—it is likely they will have the same understanding of a 
mission and share a strategic similarity (Darr and Kurtzburg, 2000).  Strategic similarity 
among all members of an organization is likely to reduce overall monitoring (agency) 
costs because agents and principals alike will share the same view of an organization.  
Further, similar backgrounds and education levels is likely to reduce transaction costs 
because there will not be as large of a differential in overall information between 
individuals.  Interestingly, knowledge creation may be stymied by this same phenomenon 
(Gruenfeld, Martorana, and Fan, 2000).  For these reasons, an organizational culture 
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encouraging membership by many similar (strategically aligned) partners might be 
considered a knowledge transfer fertile organizational culture. 
Organizational Self-Knowledge 
An organization whose members have organizational self-knowledge might 
expect more knowledge to be transferred than one whose members have little 
organizational self-knowledge because transaction costs are reduced.  Transaction costs, 
because they arise from information differentials between individuals, are reduced due to 
the amount of information individuals know about themselves and those around them.  
For this reason, an organizational culture encouraging members to maintain or increase 
their organizational self-knowledge might be considered a knowledge transfer fertile 
organizational culture. 
Divergence of Interests 
An organization whose members’ interests diverge can expect less knowledge to 
be transferred than one whose members have converging interests because both agency 
and transaction costs are likely to be increased.  Agency costs, which arise from a 
divergence of interests between principals and agents in an organization are increased 
when overall divergence of interests within an organization is increased.  Further, a 
divergence of interests seems to increase the likelihood of self-serving behavior at the 
expense of overall organizational performance—because individuals either do not 
understand how organizational performance benefits them personally, or do not care.  For 
these reasons, an organizational culture that does not encourage members to recognize 
and compensate for the costs of transferring knowledge might be considered a 
knowledge-transfer infertile organizational culture. 
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Organizational Culture Types and the Fertile Organizational Culture 
As shown earlier, there are four types of organizational cultures of interest with 
respect to knowledge transfer:  openness to change/innovation, task-oriented 
organizational growth, bureaucratic, and competition/confrontation.  In each of these 
cases, an explanation is offered for the type of organizational culture factors that might be 
associated with type of organizational culture.  As with the previous section, this section 
represents a theoretical bridge between the two theories of knowledge transfer and 
organizational culture, but is as of yet unsupported with research.  It is included to 
illustrate how the two theories might be linked together. 
Openness to Change/Innovation 
An organizational culture that is open to change, innovation, and achievement 
appears to be one in which agency costs have been properly addressed and transaction 
costs might be minimized, and the willingness to transfer knowledge might be high.  
Agency costs might be reduced because of the increased role of individual achievement 
in an openness to change/innovation culture.  Although it is possible to argue that overall 
organizational performance might suffer because of this focus, it is also likely that 
monitoring costs will be reduced—or are at the very least properly addressed by the 
increased focus on individuals.  Transaction costs might be minimized because of the 
overall encouragement of activities such as brainstorming—encouraging the sharing of 
new ideas by all members without value judgment.  The free sharing of new ideas an 
information is likely to drive down information differentials between individuals.  For 
these reasons, an organizational culture that is open to change, innovation, and 
achievement might be considered a knowledge-transfer fertile organizational culture. 
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Task-Oriented Organizational Growth 
An organizational culture that is interested in being the best and innovation 
appears to be one in which agency costs have been properly addressed, and the 
willingness to transfer knowledge might be high.  In an organization that stresses group 
performance, it is likely that monitoring costs are properly addressed in the form of 
performance monitoring.  An organization willing to pay those monitoring costs is also 
likely to reap the benefits of that investments.  For this reason, an organizational culture 
that is task-oriented might be considered a knowledge-transfer fertile organizational 
culture. 
Bureaucratic 
An organizational culture that is bureaucratic appears to be one in which neither 
agency costs nor transaction costs have been properly addressed, and the willingness to 
transfer knowledge might be low.  In a bureaucratic culture, avoidance is high and 
personal freedom is discouraged, which might lead increased overall monitoring costs.  It 
is unclear whether a bureaucratic organization is one that reduces these costs like an 
openness to change/innovation culture might, or properly addresses these costs, like a 
task-oriented organizational growth culture might.  Transaction costs might not properly 
addressed in a bureaucratic culture because overall communication is discouraged.  Any 
reduction in communication might lead to an information differential between 
individuals.  For these reasons, an organizational culture that is bureaucratic might be 
considered a knowledge-transfer infertile organizational culture. 
Competition/Confrontation 
An organizational culture that is marked by competition and confrontation 
appears to be one in which both agency costs and transaction costs have not been 
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properly addressed, and the willingness to transfer knowledge might be low.  Agency 
costs are unlikely to have been addressed in a competition/confrontation culture because 
it fosters an oppositional orientetion and competition between its members.  In this case, 
agents are unlikely to care about the strategic goals of the principal, and overall 
monitoring costs might be high.  It is unclear as to whether this type of organization takes 
these costs into account.  Transaction costs are likely to be increased in a 
competition/confrontation culture because individual power struggles are likely to reduce 
the incentive to share market information.  For these reasons, an organizational culture 




Organizational Culture and Knowledge Transfer:  Constructs and Variables 
Figure 2 lists the constructs and variables defined earlier, as well as the 
interactions explored in this research.  This research concentrated on the operationalized 
variables and the ir interactions.  It did not measure the constructs themselves or the links 
between the constructs and the operationalized variables.  Finally, organizational 
economics as a linking mechanism was not measured directly in this research.  This was 







































Figure 2:  Constructs, Operationalized Variables, and Interactions Explored 
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Organizational Culture and Knowledge Transfer:  The Hypotheses 
The four hypotheses investigated in this research are listed below and in Figure 3. 
H1:  Organizations exhibiting an “openness to change/innovation” organizational culture 
will have (a) more relational channels, (b) higher partner similarity, (c) more 
organizational self-knowledge, and (d) less divergence of interests than those not 
exhibiting an “openness to change/innovation” organizational culture. 
H2:  Organizations exhibiting a “task-oriented organizational growth” organizational 
culture will have (a) more relational channels, (b) higher partner similarity, (c) more 
organizational self-knowledge, and (d) less divergence of interests than those not 
exhibiting a “task-oriented organizational growth” organizational culture. 
H3:  Organizations exhibiting a “bureaucratic” organizational culture will have (a) fewer 
relational channels, (b) lower partner similarity, (c) less organizational self-
knowledge, and (d) more divergence of interests than those not exhibiting a 
“bureaucratic” organizational culture. 
H4:  Organizations exhibiting a “competition/confrontation” organizational culture will 
have (a) fewer relational channels, (b) lower partner similarity, (c) less organizational 
self-knowledge, and (d) more divergence of interests than those not exhibiting a 


























Figure 3:  Proposed Correlations between Operationalized Variables 
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III.  Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter explains the research methodology used to explore the relationship 
between the constructs of knowledge transfer and organizational culture.  It is divided 
into seven sections.  In the first section, the experimental design and research methods 
chosen for this research are explained.  In the second section, the population of interest is 
described, as are the various sampling frames used to determine a sample representative 
of the overall population of interest.  In the third section, the methodology used to create 
the research instrument is described.  The fourth section outlines the steps taken to gain 
permission to conduct the research with the desired sample population.  The fifth section 
outlines the pre-test undertaken to refine the survey instrument.  The sixth section 
outlines a pilot test undertaken to increase the validity of the research instrument before 
its use.  Finally, the seventh section describes the administration of the research 
instrument.  
Experimental Design and Research Method 
As noted in Chapter 2, many researchers prefer to measure organizational culture 
using longitudinal qualitative techniques (Ott, 1989).  However, longitudinal qualitative 
studies, by their nature, do not lend themselves to a large, widely diverse population.  For 
example, the Air Force, with an authorized strength of over 8,350 units located around 
the globe, staffed by more then 760,000 active duty, civilian, guard, reserve, and ready 
reserve personnel, is inaccessible to all but the most ambitious longitudinal qualitative 
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research (Air Force Magazine, 2001; Hallam, 2001).  To reach a representative sample of 
this population, this research used a cross-sectional survey design, as outlined below. 
Many authors have noted that, within the confines of established constructs, 
surveys have shown high reliability in the domains of organizational culture when both 
quantitative and qualitative techniques were used (Xenikou and Furnham, 1996; Hofstede 
and Neujen, 1990).  One of the reasons this is true is that organizational culture is a 
phenomenon that persists over time (Schein, 1990).  For this reason, a cross-sectional 
survey design was determined to be acceptable for accurately measuring the four types of 
organizational culture of interest in this research:  openness to change/innovation, task-
oriented organizational growth, bureaucratic, and competition/confrontation.  The 
instrument was developed using a mixture of validated research questions and questions 
developed based on current research.  The instrument was partially validated using both a 
pretest and a pilot study. 
In the domain of knowledge transfer, no method exists to qualitatively measure 
the construct.  However, the literature review showed four indicators of knowledge 
transfer:  relational channels, partner similarity, organizational self-knowledge, and 
divergence of interests; further, it gave indications of how to measure those four 
indicators.  Again, the large sample population favored the decision to use a cross-
sectional design with a quantitative survey instrument.  The instrument was developed 
using current research, and partially validated using both a pretest and a pilot study.   
It is important to note that the overall instrument (90 questions) was only partially 
validated.  As noted above, some questions were already validated, but some were 
developed based on current research.  Only an in-depth qualitative analysis of each of the 
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questions developed in this research effort (e.g. interviews plus questionnaires) and their 
relationship to actual organizational culture and knowledge transfer could provide full 
validation of how well the questions actually measured the constructs of interest. 
Population and Sample 
Population 
As noted above, the initial population of interest was the more than 8,350 Air 
Force units (Hallam, 2001).  Because the goal of this study was to explore the 
relationship between organizational culture as an indicator of the various environmental 
factors influencing knowledge transfer, it was important to access only those 
organizations that one would expect to have a discernable organizational culture—or 
more precisely organizations whose dominant culture coincided with the organizational 
boundaries to be measured.  This was important to consider because, as noted in Chapter 
2, organizational cultures might exist at numerous levels of an organization (e.g., at the 
squadron, group, wing, and major command levels).  Also noted in Chapter 2, it is 
possible for an organization not to have a discernable culture within its boundaries—
based on the strength of a culture existing at another level, or because a unit has not had 
the time to develop a culture yet (Ott, 1989). 
Recent research in the Air Force showed that the boundaries of organizational 
cultures are likely to coincide with the boundaries of squadrons—where individuals are 
likely to be similar, and missions are likely to be focused towards the same goals (Smith, 
1998).  For this reason, the population of interest was redefined from the 8,350 Air Force 
units to the 3,881 active duty Air Force squadrons.   
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To implement this population reduction, the author contacted the Air Force Plans 
and Programs, Office of Personnel Management.  This office provided a database query 
of more than 8,350 operational units in the Air Force.  From this list, a spreadsheet query 
separated the 4,160 squadrons.  There were 156 types of squadrons represented in this 
listing.  Since the query returned squadrons following the standard nomenclature only, 
equivalent units such as program offices and research laboratories that did not follow the 
standard nomenclature were excluded from further analysis.  From this list of squadrons, 
another spreadsheet query separated the 279 reserve squadrons from the original list of 
4,160 squadrons, leaving 3,881 active duty squadrons.  153 types of squadrons were 
represented in this final list of active duty Air Force squadrons. 
Sampling Frame 1 
Because neither the subpopulations of Air Force Guard and Reserve units were 
accessible for the purposes of this survey, their members were excluded from the sample 
population.  Additionally, Air Force civilian personnel were excluded from the sample 
population due to the administrative difficulty of requesting approval from each local 
personnel unit to poll its members. 
Sampling Frame 2 
Next, units unrepresentative of the operational Air Force because of unique or 
singular missions were eliminated from the sample population.  This was done because 
units with unique and singular missions are often small and extremely specialized; their 
cultures might not generalize to other squadrons in the Air Force.  First, squadron types 
from the list of 153 types that had 15 or fewer units categorized under them were 
excluded from the sample population.  This left 36 types of squadrons.  Next, squadron 
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types that were likely categorized as squadrons simply because of geographically specific 
or otherwise unique missions were excluded from the sample population.  There were six 
of these squadron types:  1,531 recruiting squadrons, 54 Air Combat Command program 
management squadrons, 30 aerospace medicine squadrons, 22 aeromedical dental 
squadrons, 142 training squadrons, 9 component repair squadrons, and 27 flying training 
squadrons.  This left 1,495 squadrons comprising 30 overall squadron types, as shown in 
Table 1. 
Table 1:  Types and Number of Squadrons in the Air Force 
Types Number in USAF: 
Air Base  16 
Air Mobility  23 
Air Refueling  23 
Air Support Operations  35 
Aircraft Generation  18 
Airlift            36 
Civil Engineer  88 
Communications     123 
Comptroller        55 
Contracting        64 
Dental             33 
Equipment Maintenance 18 
Fighter            88 
Flight Test  25 
Intelligence 32 
Logistics Support  66 
Maintenance        48 
Medical Operations 79 
Medical Support  74 
Mission Support  84 
Operations Support  101 
Security Forces  96 
Services           60 
Space Operations 21 
Special Operations 18 
Supply             59 
Test               20 
Transportation     60 




Sampling Frame 3 
The required sample size to achieve a representative sampling of the 1,495 
squadrons remaining in the study, using a 90 percent confidence interval with a width of 
three-quarters of one point (less than one point on the Likert-type scale), was determined 
using Equation 1 (McClave and Benson, 1991:320). 
Equation 1 :  Sample Size Required to Represent Air Force Squadrons 
n


























n 19.243=  




Sample size required 
Critical z value for a 90% confidence interval (1.645) 
Range of values for 5-point Likert-type scale (4) 
Width of confidence interval (.75) 
The results of this equation required that 20 squadrons be polled.  A forty percent return 
rate was anticipated, since some squadrons might not return a statistically significant 
number of responses due to deployment, leave, problems in contacting, or any other 
factor.  Accounting for the anticipated return rate required contacting 50 squadrons.  One 
squadron was added to this number for the pilot study, leaving a requirement to contact 
51 squadrons of sufficient size to return statistically significant results. 
Sampling Frame 4 
The final sampling frame was used to choose a sample size sufficient to represent 
each of the squadrons randomly chosen within the types of squadrons using a 90 percent 
confidence interval.  An example of the equation used to implement this sampling frame 
is shown in Equation 2 (HQ USAF/ACM:  11-14).  This example uses the information 
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collected for the squadron randomly chosen out of the 51 squadrons to be used for the 
pilot study. 
Equation 2:  Determination of Sample Size Required to Represent A Squadron 
n
N z
2( )⋅ p⋅ 1 p−( )⋅
N 1−( ) d
2( )⋅ z2( ) p⋅ 1 p−( )⋅+  
n
529 1.645
2( )⋅ .5⋅ 1 .5−( )⋅
529 1−( ) .1
2( )⋅ 1.6452( ) .5⋅ 1 .5−( )⋅+
:=
n 60=  





Sample size required 
Population (529) 
Maximum sample size factor (.5) 
Desired tolerance (.1) 
Factor of assurance, 90% confidence (1.645) 
Equation 2 was formulated specifically for attitude and opinion surveys, and hence set the 
standard for a representative sample above that of conventional analytical statistics.  In 
this case, for a total population of 529, almost 11 percent of the population was required 
to reach the desired statistic—in the example listed in Equation 2 this represented 60 
returned surveys.  A comparison to more traditional statistics shows that, regardless of 
population size, an estimator may be considered normally distributed and representative 
of the true population mean to the same tolerance as above if more than about 30 data 
points are collected. 
In each case, a twenty-five percent return rate was anticipated—and accounted 
for.  In the example listed in Equation 2, surveys were sent to 240 of the 529 members of 
the squadron in order to collect 60 responses.  Equation 2 presented a challenge in that it 
made surveying squadrons with less than 80 active duty members prohibitive, because 
the required response rate was above fifty percent.  For this reason, squadrons generated 
during random selection with less than 80 active duty members were excluded from the 
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survey administration.  In their place, alternate squadrons with more than 80 active duty 
members, also generated during random selection, were used.   
Table 2 lists the number of squadrons contacted by type, the number excluded for 
small size, and the number unable to survey. 






Excluded for Size 
Number Unable to 
Survey 
Air Base  2 0 1 
Air Mobility  2 0 0 
Air Refueling  1 2 0 
Air Support Operations  0 2 0 
Aircraft Generation  0 0 0 
Airlift            4 0 1 
Civil Engineer  3 2 0 
Communications     6 0 0 
Comptroller        0 2 0 
Contracting        0 3 0 
Dental             0 0 0 
Equipment Maintenance 1 0 0 
Fighter            9 0 0 
Flight Test  0 1 1 
Intelligence 2 1 1 
Logistics Support  2 3 0 
Maintenance        2 0 0 
Medical Operations 2 3 0 
Medical Support  1 6 0 
Mission Support  1 7 0 
Operations Support  4 1 1 
Security Forces  3 1 1 
Services           0 4 0 
Space Operations 1 1 1 
Special Operations 1 0 0 
Supply             2 0 0 
Test               0 0 0 
Transportation     2 0 0 
Weather            0 3 0 
Total Units Contacted: 51 42 7 
Fifty-one squadrons were contacted.  Forty-two squadrons were excluded for size; under-
representing air refueling, air support, comptroller, contracting, logistics support, medical 
support, mission support, services and weather squadrons in the analysis of results.  
Finally, seven squadrons were either not found during a personnel search or were 
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consolidated with another unit, and therefore were unable to be surveyed.  The 
distribution in this category was apparently random. 
Survey Development 
As identified in Chapter 2, the five types of organizational culture most likely to 
be found in organizations are:  openness to change/innovation, task-oriented 
organizational growth, bureaucratic, and competition/confrontation.  None of the four 
instruments listed by Xenikou and Furnham were available for use in this research 
(Xenikou and Furnham, 1996).  For this reason, a previously validated instrument was 
sought with similar domains measured.  The FOCUS questionnaire (van Muijen, 
Koopman, De Witte, De Cock, Susanj, Lemoine, Bourantas, Papalexandris, Branyicski, 
Spaltro, Jesuino, Das Neves, Pitariu, Konrad, Peiró, González-Romá and Turnipseed, 
1999) captured two of the four types of organizational culture, Openness to 
Change/Innovation, and Task-Oriented Organizational Growth.  Twenty-three questions 
were derived or adapted directly from this source.  To capture the other two types of 
organizational culture, Bureaucratic and Competition/Confrontation, questions were 
devised using the FOCUS questionnaire as a start, with heavy emphasis on the 
descriptions of those factors identified in Xenikou and Furnham’s (1996) research.  
Twenty-four questions were written in this manner.  Finally, a third source of questions 
was consulted to assist in phrasing of specific questions to capture items not covered by 
the FOCUS questionnaire (Hofstede and Neujen 1990), though none of the questions 
were used verbatim.   
To capture the four indicators of knowledge transfer, the author used the 
descriptions of the indicators given in the original research documents referenced in 
 
47 
Chapter 2.  Ten questions were written based on the research on Relational Channels 
(Morey and Frangioso, 1997; Rulke, Zaheer, and Anderson, 2000).  Ten questions were 
written based on the research on Partner Similarity (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Darr and 
Kurtzberg, 2000).  Twelve questions were written based on the research on 
Organizational Self-Knowledge (Moreland and Myaskovsky, 2000; Rulke, Zaheer, and 
Anderson, 2000).  Finally, eleven questions were written based on the research on 
Divergence of Interests (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Donaldson, 1990). 
The initial survey consisted of 90 items using a 5-point Likert-type scale.  The 5-
point scale was chosen to keep the survey consistent with the FOCUS questionnaire, 
which used a 5-point Likert-type scale.  The 90 items were randomly ordered to reduce 
any interaction between similar questions—reducing the ability of the respondent to 
guess the expected answers based on previous ones. 
The survey collected the following additional data on each respondent:  squadron 
name (masked from the researcher), rank/grade, highest level of schooling attained, age, 
and gender.  This data was used to test any effects on the operationalized variables other 
than those hypothesized.  Finally, the survey gave each respondent the option to add 
comments (up to 11,000 characters).  Comments were used primarily to find any 
potential problems with the survey—whether they be administrative of philosophic. 
The survey was implemented using a web-based electronic format.  Franke (2001) 
showed that as long as an electronic implementation of a survey held true to the intent of 
the original survey, and was relatively easy to use, reliability of a survey was not affected 
by its electronic implementation.  Every response was input directly into a database that 
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automatically inverted the responses to the negatively scored questions.  The entire 
survey as it appeared on the web site for the pilot test, with the exception of the radio 
buttons for each Likert-type item selection, is located in Appendix A.  The survey as 
administered to the entire population was similar to this instrument, except for the 28 
deleted questions (noted in Appendix B). 
Permission to Conduct Survey 
Permission to conduct the survey was requested 21 December 2001.  It was 
granted by Air Force Personnel Center Surveys Branch 15 January 2002, and was 
assigned the survey control number USAF SCN 02-0017, valid until 31 May 2002. 
Pre-Test 
Ten students enrolled in the Air Force Institute of Technology’s Information 
Resources program pre-tested the survey.  Each student provided information about how 
long the survey took to complete, confusing or misplaced items, as well as misspellings 
and format errors.  Their input was incorporated into the survey before conducting the 
pilot study. 
Pilot Study 
The pilot study was conducted using one squadron, alias “Maintenance Squadron 
1,” and was conducted from 22 to 29 January 2002—before the survey was administered 
to the entire sample.  The pilot test again identified any confusing or misplaced items, as 
well as misspellings and format errors, but also tested the reliability of each question as it 
measured the construct of interest.  The goal was to achieve at least a .80 reliability 
coefficient for each construct, a common standard for academic research (Straub, 1989).  
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As noted in Appendix B, reliability for all constructs except Bureaucratic (.6172) and 
Competition/Confrontation (.7179) were brought above .80 by eliminating 28 questions 
from the survey. 
As noted in Appendix C, factor analysis indicated there were some problems with 
construct overlap—but these results could be partially explained if there were, indeed, 
high correlations between the constructs.  Further, factor analysis sorted out twenty-two 
factors—indicating that some questions measured slightly different factors.  Overall, 
considering the high reliability achieved for most of the questions, this was not seen as a 
problem—in fact, it added to the richness of the questions asked—capturing more of the 
potential variance.  The actual results of the pilot study are listed with the aggregate 
results in Appendix D and Appendix E, and are noted by italics. 
Survey Administration 
The survey was administered from 30 January 2002 to 14 February 2002.  An 
electronic mail message was generated for each squadron chosen using an organizational 
account at the Air Force Institute of Technology.  This message held a link to the web 
address of the survey, a brief explanation and motivation statement, and encouraged any 
questions or comments be sent to the organizational account.  A reminder message was 
transmitted on 6 February 2002. 
One item the pre-test and pilot study’s both failed to identify was a problem with 
the scrolling frame containing the Likert-type selections—built to allow users to move 
down the list of 90 questions while continually showing the five choices at the top of the 
screen.  On some browsers, this frame did not resize as the window containing it shrank 
to fit the viewable area on different computer screens.  This item was identified midway 
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through survey administration and corrected by removing the frame.  Instead, the five 
choices were incorporated into the text of the survey.  They were repeated before every 
group of eleven questions—ensuring respondents would always have a listing of the five 
choices on-screen as they scrolled through the 62- item survey.  Users who could not 
access the survey or could not view all five options were offered the option of filling out 
an electronic document version of the survey.  Only one individual took this option.  This 




IV.  Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter explores the results of the survey described in Chapter 3.  Section 
one outlines the analytical methods and approach used to interpret the research results.  
Section two outlines the results and analysis of the first hypothesis, first for the squadron 
unit of analysis, next for the individual perception unit of analysis.  Section three outlines 
the results and analysis of the second hypothesis, using the same format as section two.  
Section four outlines the results and analysis of the third hypothesis, using the same 
format as section two.  Section five outlines the results and analysis of the fourth 
hypothesis, using the same format as section two.  Section six out lines the different 
demographics collected during the research, and explains their interactions with the 
results.  Finally, section seven provides an overview of the research results. 
Analytical Methods (Statistics) 
The survey data described in Chapter 3 were analyzed using two units of analysis:  
overall squadron culture and individual perception.  Testing the four main hypotheses at 
the squadron level was useful to measure interactions where an organizational culture 
was likely most measurable, while it was also useful to compare squadron results to 
individuals’ perceptions to see if there might be a difference between the two. 
Within the overall squadron culture unit of analysis, squadron mean scores were 
calculated for each of the 23 squadrons included for each of the eight constructs.  The 23 
squadrons included in this analysis, representing 1116 responses, were those who met or 
exceeded an 88 percent level of confidence, based on Equation 2.  This confidence 
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interval was used instead of 90 percent because it allowed the inclusion of more 
squadrons, which increased the posterior probability of squadrons in the Air Force 
multiplied by the members in each squadron (.92 x .88 = .81).  Relevant information 
regarding each squadron’s size, number required for 90 percent statistical power, actual 
number returned, and actual statistical power achieved is listed in Appendix D.  Mean 
scores for each squadron used in the analysis are listed in Appendix E.  Each of the 
constructs’ mean scores was used to produce a correlation and linear fit plot 
corresponding to each of the sixteen sub-hypotheses.  The fit was compared to the sixteen 
initial sub-hypotheses, and a determination made whether the empirical data either 
supported or did not support each hypothesis.  The sub-hypotheses are listed below in 
Table 2, to show how each of the 16 fits were run, and expected to turn out. 
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Within the second unit of analysis, individual scores were correlated directly for 
each of the sixteen sub-hypotheses, ignoring squadron mean scores.  This unit of analysis 
included 741 additional respondents whose 27 squadrons failed to meet the level of 
significance for inclusion in the squadron level of analysis.  The total number of 
respondents for this item was 1857.  Each of the constructs’ mean scores was used to 
produce a correlation and linear fit plot corresponding to each of the sixteen sub-
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hypotheses.  The constructs’ correlation and linear fit then was compared to the initial 
hypotheses, and a determination made whether the empirical data either supported, or did 
not support those hypotheses. 
Finally, reliability and factor analyses were conducted on all 1857 respondents to 
confirm questionnaire reliability.  Summary results are listed in Appendix F and 
Appendix G, and are discussed in each hypothesis section below.  An analysis was 
conducted on each remaining question represented in Appendix F to investigate whether 
any one question or group of questions proved unreliable, much the same as was done in 
Appendix B, but this analysis did not return any significant information.  Because results 
did not show any significant findings, this in-depth analysis is not included. 
Hypothesis 1:  Openness to Change/Innovation 
Overview 
Overall, hypothesis one was strongly supported with the data collected, with the 
exception of partner similarity, which showed no significant correlation with openness to 
change/innovation.  In other words, a squadron exhibiting an openness to 
change/innovation culture tended to be fertile to the transfer of knowledge.   
Each sub-hypothesis result is summarized in the tables below, with the sub-
hypothesis statement appearing above each table.  Within each table, the results of the 
squadron level of analysis are listed in column a, and the results of the individual 
perception level of analysis are shown in column b.  Each column contains the 
correlational plot, with a fit line and 90 percent oval drawn.  Next, each column contains 
the respective correlations, the significance value of each correlation, and the number of 
units of analysis represented.  A critical value (a) of .054 was chosen to represent a 95 
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percent level of confidence to two significant digits.  Therefore, a significance (p) value 
of .054 or lower (meaning there was at least a 95 percent chance that the result was not 
due to random chance) was considered significant.  Next, each column contains the linear 
fit equation for each correlational plot.  Finally, the R-square, adjusted R-square, error of 
calculation, and mean of response (y-axis) is shown, as well as the number of 
observations used in calculating these numbers (same as the number of units of analysis 
represented).  After each table, a brief explanation of the results is given. 
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Hypothesis 1a:   
Organizations exhibiting an “openness to change/innovation” organizational culture 
will have more relational channels than those not exhibiting an “openness to 
change/innovation” organizational culture. 
Table 4:  Hypothesis 1a Squadron and Individual Results 
a. Bivariate Fit of Relational Channels By 
Openness to Change/Innovation 
(Squadron) 
b. Bivariate Fit of Relational Channels By 


































1 2 3 4 5
Openness to Change/Innovation
 
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.941511 0.0000 23  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.827727 0.0000 1857  
Linear Fit 
Relational Channels = 0.7101252 + 0.835528 Openness to 
Change/Innovation 
Linear Fit 
Relational Channels = 0.8774935 + 0.7879738 Openness 
to Change/Innovation 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.886443 
RSquare Adjusted 0.881036 
Root Mean Square Error 0.066719 
Mean of Response 3.462609 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 23  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.685132 
RSquare Adjusted 0.684963 
Root Mean Square Error 0.399723 
Mean of Response 3.476661 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 1857  
Table 4a shows a strong, significant, positive correlation at the squadron level of 
analysis between openness to change/innovation and relational channels.  This result 
tends to support hypothesis 1a. 
Table 4b also shows a strong, significant, positive correlation at the individual 
perception level of analysis between openness to change/innovation and relational 
channels.  This result, while not as strong as the result for the squadron unit of analysis, 
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seems to indicate an interaction at the individual level as well.  It also highlights the fact 
that, although organizational cultures may be strong, individual perceptions still vary 
from person to person. 
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Hypothesis 1b:   
Organizations exhibiting an “openness to change/innovation” organizational culture 
will have higher partner similarity than those not exhibiting an “openness to 
change/innovation” organizational culture. 
Table 5:  Hypothesis 1b Squadron and Individual Results 
a. Bivariate Fit of Partner Similarity By 
Openness to Change/Innovation 
(Squadron) 
b. Bivariate Fit of Partner Similarity By 
































1 2 3 4 5
Openness to Change/Innovation
 
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.10089 0.6469 23  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.303139 0.0000 1857  
Linear Fit 
Partner Similarity = 2.4696152 + 0.1506269 Openness to 
Change/Innovation 
Linear Fit 
Partner Similarity = 2.0681819 + 0.2676209 Openness to 
Change/Innovation 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.010179 
RSquare Adjusted -0.03696 
Root Mean Square Error 0.33139 
Mean of Response 2.965826 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 23  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.091893 
RSquare Adjusted 0.091404 
Root Mean Square Error 0.629531 
Mean of Response 2.950942 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 1857  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.886443 
RSquare Adjusted 0.881036 
Root Mean Square Error 0.066719 
Mean of Response 3.462609 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 23  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.685132 
RSquare Adjusted 0.684963 
Root Mean Square Error 0.399723 
Mean of Response 3.476661 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 1857  
Table 5a shows a weak, positive correlation that lacks significance at the 
squadron level of analysis between openness to change/innovation and partner similarity.  
This result, while interesting, does not reach a level of significance adequate to lend 
support to hypothesis 1b. 
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Table 5b shows a weak, significant, positive correlation at the individual 
perception level of analysis between openness to change/innovation and partner 
similarity.  In other words, members who have a perception of an openness to 
change/innovation culture in their squadron also seem to recognize an inherent similarity 
among squadron members.  This difference between individual perception and squadron 
units of analys is merits further investigation; perhaps there are different types of 
squadrons in the Air Force, ones in which individuals are primarily similar, and ones in 
which individuals are primarily dissimilar.   
One additional factor that might have contributed to the weak results is the overall 
reliability of questions measuring partner similarity of .7533, as shown in Appendix F.  
This reliability differed significantly from the initial reliability of .8367 calculated based 
on the pilot study, as shown in Append ix B.  Finally, as noted in Appendix G, questions 
measuring the construct of Partner Similarity tended to load on two separate constructs.  




Hypothesis 1c:   
Organizations exhibiting an “openness to change/innovation” organizational culture 
will have more organizational self-knowledge than those not exhibiting an “openness 
to change/innovation” organizational culture. 
Table 6:  Hypothesis 1c Squadron and Individual Results 
a. Bivariate Fit of Organizational Self-
Knowledge By Openness to 
Change/Innovation (Squadron) 
b. Bivariate Fit of Organizational Self-














































1 2 3 4 5
Openness to Change/Innovation
 
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.803223 0.0000 23  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.822465 0.0000 1857  
Linear Fit 
Organizational Self-Knowledge = 0.5096041 + 0.8715848 
Openness to Change/Innovation 
Linear Fit 
Organizational Self-Knowledge = 0.7358911 + 0.805144 
Openness to Change/Innovation 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.645167 
RSquare Adjusted 0.62827 
Root Mean Square Error 0.144209 
Mean of Response 3.38087 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 23  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.676449 
RSquare Adjusted 0.676274 
Root Mean Square Error 0.416675 
Mean of Response 3.391696 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 1857  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.886443 
RSquare Adjusted 0.881036 
Root Mean Square Error 0.066719 
Mean of Response 3.462609 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 23  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.685132 
RSquare Adjusted 0.684963 
Root Mean Square Error 0.399723 
Mean of Response 3.476661 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 1857  
Table 6a shows a strong, significant, positive correlation at the squadron level of 
analysis between openness to change/innovation and organizational self-knowledge.  This 
result tends to support hypothesis 1c. 
 
60 
Table 6b also shows a strong, significant, positive correlation at the individual 
perception level of analysis between openness to change/innovation and organizational 
self-knowledge.  This result is, in fact stronger than the result for the squadron unit of 
analysis, indicating an interaction between the two constructs at the individual level—
even if the overall squadron results do not represent this relationship as strongly as 
individuals perceive it to. 
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Hypothesis 1d:   
Organizations exhibiting an “openness to change/innovation” organizational culture 
will have less divergence of interests than those not exhibiting an “openness to 
change/innovation” organizational culture. 
Table 7:  Hypothesis 1d Squadron and Individual Results 
a. Bivariate Fit of Divergence of Interests 
By Openness to Change/Innovation 
(Squadron) 
b. Bivariate Fit of Divergence of Interests 






































1 2 3 4 5
Openness to Change/Innovation
 
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
-0.9337 0.0000 23  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
-0.8514 0.0000 1857  
Linear Fit 
Divergence of Interests = 5.6276594 - 0.9425513 
Openness to Change/Innovation 
Linear Fit 
Divergence of Interests = 5.0687572 - 0.7747547 
Openness to Change/Innovation 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.8718 
RSquare Adjusted 0.865695 
Root Mean Square Error 0.080639 
Mean of Response 2.522609 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 23  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.72489 
RSquare Adjusted 0.724742 
Root Mean Square Error 0.35715 
Mean of Response 2.513193 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 1857  
Table 7a shows a strong, significant, negative correlation at the squadron level of 
analysis between openness to change/innovation and divergence of interests.  This result 
tends to support hypothesis 1d. 
Table 7b also shows a strong, significant, negative correlation at the individual 
perception level of analysis between openness to change/innovation and divergence of 
interests.  This result, while not as strong as the result for the squadron unit of analysis, 
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shows that unit members appear to be aware that a relationship exists between the two 
constructs.  It also highlights the fact that, although organizational cultures may be 
strong, individual perceptions still vary from person to person. 
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Hypothesis 2:  Task-Oriented Organizational Growth 
Overview 
Overall, hypothesis two was strongly supported with the data collected, with the 
exception of partner similarity, which showed a moderate but significant correlation with 
openness to change/innovation.  In other words, a squadron exhibiting a task-oriented 
organizational growth culture tended to be fertile to the transfer of knowledge.   
Each sub-hypothesis result is summarized in the tables below, with the sub-
hypothesis statement appearing above each table.  Within each table, the results of the 
squadron level of analysis are listed in column a, and the results of the individual 
perception level of analysis are shown in column b.  Each column contains the 
correlational plot, with a fit line and 90 percent oval drawn.  Next, each column contains 
the respective correlations, the significance value of each correlation, and the number of 
units of analysis represented.  A critical value (a) of .054 was chosen to represent a 95 
percent level of confidence to two significant digits.  Therefore, a significance (p) value 
of .054 or lower (meaning there was at least a 95 percent chance that the result was not 
due to random chance) was considered significant.  Next, each column contains the linear 
fit equation for each correlational plot.  Finally, the R-square, adjusted R-square, error of 
calculation, and mean of response (y-axis) is shown, as well as the number of 
observations used in calculating these numbers (same as the number of units of analysis 
represented).  After each table, a brief explanation of the results is given. 
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Hypothesis 2a:  
Organizations exhibiting a “task-oriented organizational growth” organizational 
culture will have more relational channels than those not exhibiting a “task-oriented 
organizational growth” organizational culture. 
Table 8:  Hypothesis 2a Squadron and Individual Results 
a. Bivariate Fit of Relational Channels By 
Task-Oriented Organizational Growth 
(Squadron) 
b. Bivariate Fit of Relational Channels By 


































1 2 3 4 5
Task-Oriented Organizational Growth
 
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.894907 0.0000 23  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.754766 0.0000 1857  
Linear Fit 
Relational Channels = 0.8196441 + 0.7943572 Task-
Oriented Organizational Growth 
Linear Fit 
Relational Channels = 0.7740444 + 0.8072902 Task-
Oriented Organizational Growth 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.800859 
RSquare Adjusted 0.791376 
Root Mean Square Error 0.088353 
Mean of Response 3.462609 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 23  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.569671 
RSquare Adjusted 0.569439 
Root Mean Square Error 0.467299 
Mean of Response 3.476661 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 1857  
Table 8a shows a strong, significant, positive correlation at the squadron level of 
analysis between task-oriented organizational growth and relational channels.  This result 
tends to support hypothesis 2a. 
Table 8b also shows a strong, significant, positive correlation at the individual 
perception level of analysis between task-oriented organizational growth and relational 
channels.  This result, while not as strong as the result for the squadron unit of analysis, 
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shows that unit members appear to be aware that a relationship exists between the two 
constructs.  It also highlights the fact that, although organizational cultures may be 
strong, individual perceptions still vary from person to person. 
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Hypothesis 2b:   
Organizations exhibiting a “task-oriented organizational growth” organizational 
culture will have higher partner similarity than those not exhibiting a “task-oriented 
organizational growth” organizational culture. 
Table 9:  Hypothesis 2b Squadron and Individual Results 
a. Bivariate Fit of Partner Similarity By 
Task-Oriented Organizational Growth 
(Squadron) 
b. Bivariate Fit of Partner Similarity By 
































1 2 3 4 5
Task-Oriented Organizational Growth
 
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.495233 0.0163 23  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.395695 0.0000 1857  
Linear Fit 
Partner Similarity = 0.5052156 + 0.7395497 Task-Oriented 
Organizational Growth 
Linear Fit 
Partner Similarity = 1.6369685 + 0.3924929 Task-Oriented 
Organizational Growth 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.245256 
RSquare Adjusted 0.209316 
Root Mean Square Error 0.289375 
Mean of Response 2.965826 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 23  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.156574 
RSquare Adjusted 0.15612 
Root Mean Square Error 0.606697 
Mean of Response 2.950942 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 1857  
Table 9a shows a significant, positive correlation at the squadron level of analysis 
between task-oriented organizational growth and partner similarity.  This result tends to 
support hypothesis 2b. 
Table 9b also shows a significant, positive correlation at the individual perception 
level of analysis between task-oriented organizational growth and partner similarity.  This 
result, while not as strong as the result for the squadron unit of analysis, shows that unit 
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members appear to be aware that a relationship exists between the two constructs.  It also 
highlights the fact that, although organizational cultures may be strong, individual 
perceptions still vary from person to person. 
One factor that might have weakened results in this item is the overall reliability 
of questions measuring partner similarity of .7533, as shown in Appendix F.  This 
reliability differed significantly from the initial reliability of .8367 calculated based on 
the pilot study, as shown in Appendix B.  Finally, as noted in Appendix G, questions 
measuring the construct of Partner Similarity tended to load on two separate constructs.  





Hypothesis 2c:   
Organizations exhibiting a “task-oriented organizational growth” organizational 
culture will have more organizational self-knowledge than those not exhibiting a 
“task-oriented organizational growth” organizational culture. 
Table 10:  Hypothesis 2c Squadron and Individual Results 
a. Bivariate Fit of Organizational Self-
Knowledge By Task-Oriented 
Organizational Growth (Squadron) 
b. Bivariate Fit of Organizational Self-
Knowledge By Task-Oriented 













































1 2 3 4 5
Task-Oriented Organizational Growth
 
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.954252 0.0000 23  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.80986 0.0000 1857  
Linear Fit 
Organizational Self-Knowledge = -0.065124 + 1.035712 
Task-Oriented Organizational Growth 
Linear Fit 
Organizational Self-Knowledge = 0.4096519 + 0.890757 
Task-Oriented Organizational Growth 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.910597 
RSquare Adjusted 0.90634 
Root Mean Square Error 0.072386 
Mean of Response 3.38087 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 23  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.655874 
RSquare Adjusted 0.655688 
Root Mean Square Error 0.42972 
Mean of Response 3.391696 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 1857  
Table 10a shows a strong, significant, positive correlation at the squadron level of 
analysis between task-oriented organizational growth and organizational self-knowledge.  
This result tends to support hypothesis 2c. 
Table 10b also shows a strong, significant, positive correlation at the individual 
perception level of analysis between task-oriented organizational growth and 
organizational self-knowledge.  This result, while not as strong as the result for the 
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squadron unit of analysis, shows that unit members appear to be aware that a relationship 
exists between the two constructs.  It also highlights the fact that, although organizational 
cultures may be strong, individual perceptions still vary from person to person. 
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Hypothesis 2d:   
Organizations exhibiting a “task-oriented organizational growth” organizational 
culture will have less divergence of interests than those not exhibiting a “task-
oriented organizational growth” organizational culture. 
Table 11:  Hypothesis 2d Squadron and Individual Results 
a. Bivariate Fit of Divergence of Interests 
By Task -Oriented Organizational Growth 
(Squadron) 
b. Bivariate Fit of Divergence of Interests 






































1 2 3 4 5
Task-Oriented Organizational Growth
 
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
-0.9419 0.0000 23  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
-0.82214 0.0000 1857  
Linear Fit 
Divergence of Interests = 5.6869339 - 0.951055 Task-
Oriented Organizational Growth 
Linear Fit 
Divergence of Interests = 5.3271708 - 0.8405544 Task-
Oriented Organizational Growth 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.887184 
RSquare Adjusted 0.881812 
Root Mean Square Error 0.075646 
Mean of Response 2.522609 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 23  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.675911 
RSquare Adjusted 0.675737 
Root Mean Square Error 0.387641 
Mean of Response 2.513193 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 1857  
Table 11a shows a strong, significant, negative correlation at the squadron level of 
analysis between task-oriented organizational growth and divergence of interests.  This 
result tends to support hypothesis 2d. 
Table 11b also shows a strong, significant, negative correlation at the individual 
perception level of analysis between task-oriented organizational growth and divergence 
of interests.  This result, while not as strong as the result for the squadron unit of analysis, 
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shows that unit members appear to be aware that a relationship exists between the two 
constructs.  It also highlights the fact that, although organizational cultures may be 
strong, individual perceptions still vary from person to person. 
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Hypothesis 3:  Bureaucratic 
Overview 
Overall, hypothesis three was not supported with the data collected.  In other 
words, there does not appear to be a correlation between a squadron exhibiting a 
bureaucratic culture and one that is fertile to the transfer of knowledge.   
Results may have been weakened by the reliability of the instrument used to 
measure the construct of bureaucratic culture, initially shown in Appendix B to be .6172 
based on the pilot study, and shown Appendix F to be .3575 once all results were 
tabulated.  In this case, where only 7 of every 20 questions asked in this area were in 
agreement and only 5 questions were asked, it is clear that this instrument was either 
poorly worded or interpreted quite differently from individual to individual.  An 
exploration of whether eliminating more questions would have increased overall 
reliability showed this was not the case. 
It is also possible that the assumptions about bureaucratic culture were incorrect, 
and that bureaucratic cultures do address one or more of agency costs and transaction 
costs.  In the case of agency costs, it is possible that a bureaucratic organization addresses 
them by its very structure—increasing overall monitoring of agent behavior.  It is also 
possible that a bureaucratic organization addresses transaction costs by providing a 
standard framework for generating the answers to questions—in essence acting as a 
surrogate for complete market information.  Considering these two possibilities, it is 
further made clear that individual perception of what the questions were measuring might 
have been swayed by these alternate interpretations of what was meant by the concept of 
“bureaucracy.”  For example, questions such as “the chain of command is important” 
 
73 
might have directly contradicted with ones such as “conflict is avoided at all costs,” even 
though they both attempted to measure the same construct. 
Each sub-hypothesis result is summarized in the tables below, with the sub-
hypothesis statement appearing above each table.  Within each table, the results of the 
squadron level of analysis are listed in column a, and the results of the individual 
perception level of analysis are shown in column b.  Each column contains the 
correlational plot, with a fit line and 90 percent oval drawn.  Next, each column contains 
the respective correlations, the significance value of each correlation, and the number of 
units of analysis represented.  A critical value (a) of .054 was chosen to represent a 95 
percent level of confidence to two significant digits.  Therefore, a significance (p) value 
of .054 or lower (meaning there was at least a 95 percent chance that the result was not 
due to random chance) was considered significant.  Next, each column contains the linear 
fit equation for each correlational plot.  Finally, the R-square, adjusted R-square, error of 
calculation, and mean of response (y-axis) is shown, as well as the number of 
observations used in calculating these numbers (same as the number of units of analysis 
represented).  After each table, a brief explanation of the results is given. 
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Hypothesis 3a:   
Organizations exhibiting a “bureaucratic” organizational culture will have fewer 
relational channels than those not exhibiting a “bureaucratic” organizational culture. 
Table 12:  Hypothesis 3a Squadron and Individual Results 
a. Bivariate Fit of Relational Channels 
By Bureaucratic 
(Squadron) 



































1 2 3 4 5
Bureaucratic
 
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
-0.17067 0.4362 23  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.02301 0.3217 1857  
Linear Fit 
Relational Channels = 4.2580824 - 0.2766405 
Bureaucratic 
Linear Fit 
Relational Channels = 3.3908818 + 0.02983 Bureaucratic 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.029129 
RSquare Adjusted -0.0171 
Root Mean Square Error 0.195084 
Mean of Response 3.462609 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 23  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.000529 
RSquare Adjusted -9.33e-6 
Root Mean Square Error 0.712164 
Mean of Response 3.476661 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 1857  
Table 12a shows a weak, negative correlation that lacks significance at the 
squadron level of analysis between bureaucratic and relational channels.  Though 
interesting, this result is not strong enough to lend support hypothesis 3a, especially 
considering the questionable reliability of the bureaucratic questions (.3575).  What is 
somewhat surprising is that Air Force squadrons as a whole do not appear overly 
bureaucratic (mean score less than 3).  Again, this result is tempered by the lack of 
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overall reliability of the measure used, in addition to the apparent confusion generated by 
this lack of reliability. 
Table 12b also shows no significant correlation at the individual perception level 
of analysis between bureaucratic and relational channels.  These results indicate that not 
only is there significant variance in individual perception of bureaucratic cultures but also 
that the Air Force as a whole sees itself as less bureaucratic.  The weak correlation at the 
squadron level of analysis and lack of any correlation at the individual perception level of 
analysis may be because the bureaucratic questions did not achieve the desired level of 
reliability, and therefore did not accurately measure the construct in question.  Recall that 
the inter-question reliability of the bureaucratic questions was .3575, meaning that only 7 
of every 20 responses recorded for this construct agreed.  Only a thorough analysis of this 
construct using a reliable instrument can determine whether the above results were 
actually significant or not. 
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Hypothesis 3b:   
Organizations exhibiting a “bureaucratic” organizational culture will have lower 
partner similarity than those not exhibiting a “bureaucratic” organizational culture. 
Table 13:  Hypothesis 3b Squadron and Individual Results 
a. Bivariate Fit of Partner Similarity 
By Bureaucratic 
(Squadron) 

































1 2 3 4 5
Bureaucratic
 
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.029661 0.8931 23  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.281448 0.0000 1857  
Linear Fit 
Partner Similarity = 2.73325 + 0.0808826 Bureaucratic  
Linear Fit 
Partner Similarity = 1.9779392 + 0.3383644 Bureaucratic  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.00088 
RSquare Adjusted -0.0467 
Root Mean Square Error 0.332943 
Mean of Response 2.965826 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 23  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.079213 
RSquare Adjusted 0.078717 
Root Mean Square Error 0.633911 
Mean of Response 2.950942 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 1857  
Table 13a shows no significant correlation at the squadron level of analysis 
between bureaucratic and partner similarity.  This result does not lend support to 
hypothesis 3b.  This result is unsurprising, considering the questionable reliability of the 
bureaucratic questions (.3575).  What is somewhat surprising is that Air Force squadrons 
as a whole do not appear overly bureaucratic (mean score less than 3).  Again, this result 
is tempered by the lack of overall reliability of the measure used, in addition to the 
apparent confusion generated by this lack of reliability. 
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Table 13b also shows a weak, significant, positive correlation at the individual 
perception level of analysis between bureaucratic and partner similarity.  These results 
appear to directly contradict the original hypothesis.  Indeed, on the aggregate, the 
construct of partner similarity did not behave as expected.  Perhaps this was because, as 
hypothesized earlier, there is a mixture of different types of squadrons in the Air Force—
those in which the members are primarily similar, and those in which the members were 
primarily dissimilar.   
The lack of correlation at the squadron level of analysis and weak correlation at 
the individual perception level of analysis may be because the bureaucratic questions did 
not achieve the desired level of reliability, and therefore did not accurately measure the 
construct in question.  Recall that the inter-question reliability of the bureaucratic 
questions was .3575, meaning that only 7 of every 20 responses recorded for this 
construct agreed.  Only a thorough analysis of this construct using a reliable instrument 
can determine whether the above results were actually significant or not. 
One additional factor that might have contributed to the weak results is the overall 
reliability of questions measuring partner similarity of .7533, as shown in Appendix F.  
This reliability differed significantly from the initial reliability of .8367 calculated based 
on the pilot study, as shown in Appendix B.  Finally, as noted in Appendix G, questions 
measuring the construct of Partner Similarity tended to load on two separate constructs.  





Hypothesis 3c:   
Organizations exhibiting a “bureaucratic” organizational culture will have less 
organizational self-knowledge than those not exhibiting a “bureaucratic” 
organizational culture. 
Table 14:  Hypothesis 3c Squadron and Individual Results 
a. Bivariate Fit of Organizational Self-
Knowledge By Bureaucratic 
(Squadron) 
b. Bivariate Fit of Organizational Self-














































1 2 3 4 5
Bureaucratic
 
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
-0.00558 0.9798 23  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.090214 0.0001 1857  
Linear Fit 
Organizational Self-Knowledge = 3.4126736 - 0.0110604 
Bureaucratic 
Linear Fit 
Organizational Self-Knowledge = 3.0458626 + 0.1202645 
Bureaucratic 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.000031 
RSquare Adjusted -0.04759 
Root Mean Square Error 0.242087 
Mean of Response 3.38087 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 23  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.008139 
RSquare Adjusted 0.007604 
Root Mean Square Error 0.729545 
Mean of Response 3.391696 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 1857  
Table 14a shows no significant correlation at the squadron level of analysis 
between bureaucratic and organizational self-knowledge.  This result does not lend 
support to hypothesis 3c.  This result is unsurprising, considering the questionable 
reliability of the bureaucratic questions (.3575).  What is somewhat surprising is that Air 
Force squadrons as a whole do not appear overly bureaucratic (mean score of less than 3).    
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Again, this result is tempered by the lack of overall reliability of the measure used, in 
addition to the apparent confusion generated by this lack of reliability. 
Table 14b also shows a weak, significant, positive correlation at the individual 
perception level of analysis between bureaucratic and organizational self-knowledge.  
The lack of significant correlation at the squadron level of analysis and weak correlation 
at the individual perception level of analysis may be because the bureaucratic questions 
did not achieve the desired level of reliability, and therefore did not accurately measure 
the construct in question.  Recall that the inter-question reliability of the bureaucratic 
questions was .3575, meaning that only 7 of every 20 responses recorded for this 
construct agreed.  Only a thorough analysis of this construct using a reliable instrument 
can determine whether the above results were actually significant or not. 
 
80 
Hypothesis 3d:   
Organizations exhibiting a “bureaucratic” organizational culture will have more 
divergence of interests than those not exhibiting a “bureaucratic” organizational 
culture. 
Table 15:  Hypothesis 3d Squadron and Individual Results 
a. Bivariate Fit of Divergence of Interests 
By Bureaucratic 
(Squadron) 







































1 2 3 4 5
Bureaucratic
 
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.07509 0.7335 23  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
-0.05313 0.0220 1857  
Linear Fit 
Divergence of Interests = 2.1245005 + 0.1384494 
Bureaucratic 
Linear Fit 
Divergence of Interests = 2.7025234 - 0.0658401 
Bureaucratic 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.005638 
RSquare Adjusted -0.04171 
Root Mean Square Error 0.224581 
Mean of Response 2.522609 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 23  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.002823 
RSquare Adjusted 0.002285 
Root Mean Square Error 0.679962 
Mean of Response 2.513193 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 1857  
Table 15a shows a weak positive correlation that lacks significance at the 
squadron level of analysis between bureaucratic and divergence of interests.  This result 
does not lend support to hypothesis 3d.  This result is unsurprising, considering the 
questionable reliability of the bureaucratic questions (.3575).  What is somewhat 
surprising is that Air Force squadrons as a whole do not appear overly bureaucratic (mean 
score of less than 3).    Again, this result is tempered by the lack of overall reliability of 
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the measure used, in addition to the apparent confusion generated by this lack of 
reliability. 
Table 15b also shows an extremely weak, significant, negative correlation at the 
individual perception level of analysis between bureaucratic and divergence of interests.  
The lack of significant correlation at the squadron level of analysis and weak correlation 
at the individual perception level of analysis may be because the bureaucratic questions 
did not achieve the desired level of reliability, and therefore did not accurately measure 
the construct in question.  Recall that the inter-question reliability of the bureaucratic 
questions was .3575, meaning that only 7 of every 20 responses recorded for this 
construct agreed.  Only a thorough analysis of this construct using a reliable instrument 
can determine whether the above results were actually significant or not. 
 
82 
Hypothesis 4:  Competition/Confrontation 
Overview 
Overall, hypothesis four was moderately supported with the data collected, with 
the exception of partner similarity, which showed no significant correlation with 
competition/confrontation.  In other words, a squadron exhibiting a 
competition/confrontation culture tended to be infertile to the transfer of knowledge.  
Results may have been weakened by the reliability of the instrument used to measure the 
construct of competition/confrontation, initially shown in Appendix B to be .7179 based 
on the pilot study, and shown Appendix F to be .6422 once all results were tabulated.   
Each sub-hypothesis result is summarized in the tables below, with the sub-
hypothesis statement appearing above each table.  Within each table, the results of the 
squadron level of analysis are listed in column a, and the results of the individual 
perception level of analysis are shown in column b.  Each column contains the 
correlational plot, with a fit line and 90 percent oval drawn.  Next, each column contains 
the respective correlations, the significance value of each correlation, and the number of 
units of analysis represented.  A critical value (a) of .054 was chosen to represent a 95 
percent level of confidence to two significant digits.  Therefore, a significance (p) value 
of .054 or lower (meaning there was at least a 95 percent chance that the result was not 
due to random chance) was considered significant.  Next, each column contains the linear 
fit equation for each correlational plot.  Finally, the R-square, adjusted R-square, error of 
calculation, and mean of response (y-axis) is shown, as well as the number of 
observations used in calculating these numbers (same as the number of units of analysis 
represented).  After each table, a brief explanation of the results is given. 
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Hypothesis 4a:   
Organizations exhibiting a “competition/confrontation” organizational culture will 
have fewer relational channels than those not exhibiting a 
“competition/confrontation” organizational culture. 
Table 16:  Hypothesis 4a Squadron and Individual Results 
a. Bivariate Fit of Relational Channels By 
Competition/Confrontation 
(Squadron) 



































1 2 3 4 5
Competition/Controntation
 
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
-0.62579 0.0014 23  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
-0.36413 0.0000 1857  
Linear Fit 
Relational Channels = 5.769458 - 0.7817524 
Competition/Confrontation 
Linear Fit 
Relational Channels = 4.7849043 - 0.4443095 
Competition/Confrontation 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.391612 
RSquare Adjusted 0.362641 
Root Mean Square Error 0.15443 
Mean of Response 3.462609 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 23  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.132591 
RSquare Adjusted 0.132124 
Root Mean Square Error 0.663448 
Mean of Response 3.476661 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 1857  
Table 16a shows a significant negative correlation at the squadron level of 
analysis between competition/confrontation and relational channels.  This result tends to 
support hypothesis 4a. 
Table 16b also shows a weak, significant, negative correlation at the individual 
perception level of analysis between competition/confrontation and relational channels.  
This result, while not as strong as the result for the squadron unit of analysis, shows that 
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unit members appear to be aware that a relationship exists between the two constructs.  It 
also highlights the fact that, although organizational cultures may be strong, individual 
perceptions still vary from person to person.  The weak correlation at the individual 
perception level of analysis may be because the competition/confrontation questions did 
not achieve the desired level of reliability, and therefore did not accurately measure the 
construct in question.  Recall that the reliability of the competition/confrontation 





Hypothesis 4b:   
Organizations exhibiting a “competition/confrontation” organizational culture will 
have lower partner similarity than those not exhibiting a “competition/confrontation” 
organizational culture. 
Table 17:  Hypothesis 4b Squadron and Individual Results 
a. Bivariate Fit of Partner Similarity By 
Competition/Confrontation 
(Squadron) 

































1 2 3 4 5
Competition/Confrontation
 
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.26859 0.2153 23  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.033861 0.1447 1857  
Linear Fit 
Partner Similarity = 1.3001118 + 0.5644825 
Competition/Confrontation 
Linear Fit 
Partner Similarity = 2.8381218 + 0.0383163 
Competition/Confrontation 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.07214 
RSquare Adjusted 0.027957 
Root Mean Square Error 0.32085 
Mean of Response 2.965826 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 23  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.001147 
RSquare Adjusted 0.000608 
Root Mean Square Error 0.660236 
Mean of Response 2.950942 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 1857  
Table 17a shows a weak positive correlation that lacks significance at the 
squadron level of analysis between competition/confrontation and partner similarity.  
This result does not lend support to hypothesis 4b; indeed, this result appears to directly 
contradict hypothesis 4b. 
Table 17b also shows no significant correlation at the individual perception level 
of analysis between competition/confrontation and partner similarity.  The weak 
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correlation at the squadron level of analysis and lack of correlation at the individual 
perception level of analysis may be because the competition/confrontation questions did 
not achieve the desired level of reliability, and therefore did not accurately measure the 
construct in question.  Recall that the reliability of the competition/confrontation 
questions was .6422, meaning that only 13 of every 20 responses recorded for this 
construct agreed.  However, in this case, as in two of the previous three cases, partner 
similarity did not behave as expected.  As hypothesized previously, this could be because 
there is a mixture of different types of squadrons in the Air Force—those in which the 
members are primarily similar, and those in which the members were primarily 
dissimilar.   
One additional factor that might have contributed to the weak results is the overall 
reliability of questions measuring partner similarity of .7533, as shown in Appendix F.  
This reliability differed significantly from the initial reliability of .8367 calculated based 
on the pilo t study, as shown in Appendix B.  Finally, as noted in Appendix G, questions 
measuring the construct of Partner Similarity tended to load on two separate constructs.  






Hypothesis 4c:   
Organizations exhibiting a “competition/confrontation” organizational culture will 
have less organizational self-knowledge than those not exhibiting a 
“competition/confrontation” organizational culture. 
Table 18:  Hypothesis 4c Squadron and Individual Results 
a. Bivariate Fit of Organizational Self-
Knowledge By Competition/Confrontation 
(Squadron) 
b. Bivariate Fit of Organizational Self-














































1 2 3 4 5
Competition/Confrontation
 
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
-0.40874 0.0528 23  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
-0.37335 0.0000 1857  
Linear Fit 
Organizational Self-Knowledge = 5.2232289 - 0.6243446 
Competition/Confrontation 
Linear Fit 
Organizational Self-Knowledge = 4.7710457 - 0.4684591 
Competition/Confrontation 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.167067 
RSquare Adjusted 0.127403 
Root Mean Square Error 0.220945 
Mean of Response 3.38087 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 23  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.139388 
RSquare Adjusted 0.138924 
Root Mean Square Error 0.679564 
Mean of Response 3.391696 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 1857  
 Table 18a shows a significant negative correlation at the squadron level of 
analysis between competition/confrontation and organizational self-knowledge.  This 
result tends to support hypothesis 4c. 
Table 18b also shows a weak, significant, negative correlation at the individual 
perception level of analysis between competition/confrontation and organizational self-
knowledge.  This result, while not as strong as the result for the squadron unit of analysis, 
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shows that unit members appear to be aware that a relationship exists between the two 
constructs.  It also highlights the fact that, although organizational cultures may be 
strong, individual perceptions still vary from person to person.  The weak correlation at 
the individual perception level of analysis may be because the competition/confrontation 
questions did not achieve the desired level of reliability, and therefore did not accurately 
measure the construct in question.  Recall that the reliability of the 
competition/confrontation questions was .6422, meaning that only 13 of every 20 




Hypothesis 4d:  
Organizations exhibiting a “competition/confrontation” organizational culture will 
have more divergence of interests than those not exhibiting a 
“competition/confrontation” organizational culture. 
Table 19:  Hypothesis 4d Squadron and Individual Results 
a. Bivariate Fit of Divergence of Interests By 
Competition/Confrontation 
(Squadron) 







































1 2 3 4 5
Competition/Confrontation
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.645043 0.0009 23  
Correlation  
Correlation P-value Number 
0.386921 0.0000 1857  
Linear Fit 
Divergence of Interests = -0.182227 + 0.9166233 
Competition/Confrontation 
Linear Fit 
Divergence of Interests = 1.1844031 + 0.4512879 
Competition/Confrontation 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.41608 
RSquare Adjusted 0.388274 
Root Mean Square Error 0.172099 
Mean of Response 2.522609 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 23  
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.149708 
RSquare Adjusted 0.149249 
Root Mean Square Error 0.627888 
Mean of Response 2.513193 
Observations (or Sum Weights) 1857  
  
Table 19a shows a positive, significant correlation at the squadron level of 
analysis between competition/confrontation and divergence of interests.  This result tends 
to support hypothesis 4d. 
Table 19b also shows a weak, significant, positive correlation at the individual 
perception level of analysis between competition/confrontation and divergence of 
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interests.  This result, while not as strong as the result for the squadron unit of analysis, 
shows that unit members appear to be aware that a relationship exists between the two 
constructs.  It also highlights the fact that, although organizational cultures may be 
strong, individual perceptions still vary from person to person.  .  The weak correlation at 
the individual perception level of analysis may be because the competition/confrontation 
questions did not achieve the desired level of reliability, and therefore did not accurately 
measure the construct in question.  Recall that the reliability of the 
competition/confrontation questions was .6422, meaning that only 13 of every 20 




Summary information for the demographics collected is listed in Table 20. 
Table 20:  Respondent Demographic Information 
Demographic Total Number of % of Total 
Gender   
Male 1475 79.4% 
Female 382 20.6% 
TOTAL: 1857 100% 
Age   
> 21 105 5.7% 
21-25 385 20.7% 
26-30 385 20.7% 
31-35 373 20.1% 
36-40 418 22.5% 
41-45 166 8.9% 
46-50 20 1.1% 
50 < 5 0.3% 
TOTAL: 1857 100% 
Rank    
AB 2 0.1% 
Amn 10 0.5% 
A1C 202 10.9% 
SrA 215 11.6% 
SSgt 449 24.2% 
TSgt 350 18.8% 
MSgt 260 14.0% 
SMSgt 44 2.4% 
CMSgt 16 0.9% 
2d Lt 28 1.5% 
1st Lt 61 3.3% 
Capt 132 7.1% 
Maj 45 2.4% 
Lt Col 31 1.7% 
Col 3 0.2% 
Gen 1 0.1% 
Other 6 0.3% 
GS 0-10 1 0.1% 
GS 11-14 1 0.1% 
TOTAL: 1857 100% 
Education Level   
High School 792 42.6% 
Associates 295 15.9% 
CCAF 312 16.8% 
Bachelors 261 14.1% 
Post-Graduate 58 3.1% 
Masters 125 6.7% 
Doctoral or Post-Doctoral 14 0.8% 
TOTAL: 1857 100% 
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To determine whether there were any confounding effects of demographics, an 
analysis of means and variances was conducted for each of the four demographics.  An 
example of a test is enclosed in Appendix H, for gender; however, each of the tests 
conducted is not included because of their length, and overall lack of significance found.  
Instead, a summary of the tests and general trends noticed are given in Table 21. 
Table 21:  Results of Demographic-Based Means/Variances Analysis 
Demographic Results 
Gender Females consistently scored slightly lower than Males on every construct; 
except for the questions measuring divergence of interests (which were 
negatively scored).  Results did not exceed .05 of one Likert-type point, 
and were therefore not significant. 
Age Younger respondents consistently showed a lower opinion of squadron 
cultures than other age groups (e.g. younger respondents saw their 
squadrons as more bureaucratic, and with a higher divergence of 
interests).  This general trend was excepted on the organizational culture 
construct of task-oriented organizational growth, for which there was no 
difference in mean scores between age groups.  This general trend was 
reversed on the knowledge transfer construct of partner similarity—with 
younger respondents tending to see themselves as more similar to 
knowledge transfer partners than older respondents.  Interestingly, 
younger respondents tended to see their squadron as having less 
organizational self-knowledge than older respondents did.  One might 
argue this is because younger respondents would tend to have less 
organizational self-knowledge than older respondents do.  There were not 
enough results for the age groups < 21, 46-50, and 50 < to analyze their 
results.  In each case, mean scores did not differ markedly (by more than 
.5 of one Likert-type point). 
Rank  Individuals will less rank appeared to show a lower opinion of squadron 
cultures and factors indicating knowledge transfer than individuals with 
more rank; however, the results were inconsistent from factor to factor and 
they varied considerably, with responses ranging widely across the Likert-
type scale. 
Educational Level Individuals with lower education levels consistently showed a lower 
opinion of squadron cultures and factors indicating knowledge transfer 
than individuals with higher education levels (e.g. lower education levels 
saw their squadrons as more bureaucratic, and with a higher divergence 
of interests).  Quite markedly, High School, Associates, and Community 
College of the Air Force results clumped together, with Bachelors, Post-
Graduate, and Masters also clumping together.  There were not enough 
results for Doctoral and Post-doctoral individuals to analyze their results.  





Table 22 summarizes the conclusions reached after analysis of the research.  Ten 
of the sixteen hypotheses were supported, while six were not supported.   











    
Task-Oriented 
Organizational Growth 
    
 
Bureaucratic 
    
Competition/ 
Confrontation 
    
The low reliability of the survey instrument may explain the lack of correlation in the 
Bureaucratic construct.  The low reliability of the survey instrument in Bureaucratic and 
Competition/Confrontation may also explain the lack of significant results in two of the 
four instances of Partner Similarity, though this result may also be because squadrons in 
the Air Force are a mixture of primarily similar and primarily dissimilar units.  Clearly 
more research on the construct of Partner Similarity is required before drawing any firm 
conclusions about this construct. 
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V.  Conclusion and Recommendations  
Research Question 
Upon completing the research, the answer to the research question, “is there a 
correlation between types of organizational culture and factors influencing knowledge 
transfer,” appears to be a qualified yes, there is a correlation between some types of 
organizational culture and some factors influencing knowledge transfer. 
Research Question Discussion 
According to Kachigan (1986), when it exis ts between two constructs, correlation 
provides the following three pieces of information.  First, correlation serves a descriptive 
function, showing how things appear to be in reality.  Second, correlation serves a 
predictive function, possibly allowing the measurement of a surrogate construct to predict 
an unknown second, but correlated, construct.  Third, it provides the capability to 
examine how much of the variance of one variable accounts for variance in a second, 
correlated variable.  One item he fur ther notes, in caution, is that correlation, “does not 
imply causality.”  (Kachigan, 1986:213) 
Having established a correlational relationship between types of organizational 
culture and factors influencing knowledge transfer, this research lays the groundwork for 
academics interested in the interaction between organizational culture and other 
variables.  Perhaps most importantly, the ability to link together a theory of how 
individuals behave in a group setting to a theory of how individuals behave as separate 
entities will spur further research into how the two units of measurement interact.  
Further, this research provides a view of the link between group and individual 
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dynamics—that of the rather obscure theory of organizational economics.  Perhaps this 
theory will continue to receive attention commensurate with its importance in future 
academic research. 
Having established a correlational relationship between types of organizational 
culture and factors influencing knowledge transfer, this research lays the groundwork for 
practitioners interested in possible ways to increase knowledge transfer in their 
organizations.  First, because the constructs of organizational culture and knowledge 
transfer appear to be correlated, the practitioner can attempt to measure one of the two 
constructs, then make educated inferences about the state of the other construct in his or 
her organization.  This can reduce the time and cost burden of measuring constructs of 
interest when considering implementing knowledge management projects.  Second, once 
an organization is measured, the practitioner can best decide how to proceed.  As outlined 
in Chapter 1, this decision is a critical one considering the failure of many recent 
knowledge management efforts—and the costs associated with them. 
This research appears to lend support to some practitioners’ caution that, 
“Organizational learning is a long-term activity that will build competitive advantage 
over time and requires sustained management attention, commitment, and effort.”  (Goh, 
1998:15)  Put another way, if a relationship exists between organizational culture and 
knowledge transfer, there may not be any “quick fixes” to an organization that does not 
have a culture fertile to knowledge transfer.  The solution is probably not to try to capture 
as much as one can about an employee’s mind before the employee walks out the door; at 
this point it is probably too late.  Instead, building an organizational culture fertile to 
knowledge transfer begins with senior leadership—and a commitment towards changing 
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culture the only way it has been shown to change:  slowly.  Even if there is no direct 
causal relationship between knowledge transfer and organizational culture, one might 
argue a management change effort directed at changing an organization’s culture is a 
good place to start—with potential trickle-down benefits in the area of knowledge 
transfer.  Until such a causal relationship is proven, one might argue this is still the best 
place to start. 
However, one basic truth about organizational culture is it sometimes proves 
unwieldy to manage, and is therefore “frequently overlooked or misunderstood.”  (Vesta, 
Fralix, and Spreier, 1997)  Considering the long-term consequences of failing to properly 
manage an organizational culture, it is probably advisable to try; however, any attempt to 
manage organizational culture must begin with full management commitment to take the 
time and put forth the effort to understand it.  One researcher advises, “The issue for 
senior management, then, is not choosing the ‘correct’ basic assumptions, but identifying 
those that will promote the most successful organizational performance.”  (Young, 
2000:20).  Another warns that organizations may fail to create a unique, desired culture if 
there is a discrepancy between “what we say” and “what we do.”  (Kyung-Koo, 2000) 
Limitations  
As mentioned above, one limitation of correlational research is that it cannot 
prove causation.  In this case, though there appears to be a correlation between 
organizational culture types and indicators of knowledge transfer, one can only guess if 
one of the constructs actually causes the other.  At the same time, it is also possible that a 
third construct or group of constructs causes both of the constructs to act the way they do. 
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Another limitation of the research performed is that even though a correlation is 
shown between organizational culture types and indicators of knowledge transfer, there is 
no empirical evidence to show that the indicators of knowledge transfer actually predict 
any significant level of transfer of knowledge.  Only further confirmatory research can 
hope to show this essential link between theory and reality. 
Another limitation to the research performed, as mentioned in Chapter 2, is the 
inherent problem with attempting to measure the constructs of organizational culture and 
knowledge transfer through a cross-sectional, self-report survey instrument.  Previous 
culture research has shown anecdotal information suggesting a high correlation between 
culture scores and employee disenfranchisement (Key, 1999).  In other words, the entire 
construct of culture is continually confounded in measurement by employee satisfaction.  
Again, only further confirmatory research separating culture from satisfaction can hope to 
show this essential link between theory and reality. 
Finally, a limitation that only partially affected the research was the fact that two 
organizational culture constructs, Bureaucratic (.6172) and Competition/Confrontation 
(.7179), did not exhibit a strong inter-question reliability.  In the case of Bureaucratic, the 
results were inconclusive, while in the case of Competition/Confrontation, the results 
may be either understated or overstated.  Future efforts must pay close attention to the 
validation of instruments used to measure constructs of interest.   
Future Research 
This research is preliminary in nature, and has the limitations expressed above.  
For these reasons, this research exposes several additional areas for further research.  
First, a subsequent study might study the behavior of the two constructs of organizational 
 
98 
culture and knowledge transfer in a longitudinal study, to establish a precedent for how to 
interpret the correlation shown in this research with respect to an actual organization.  
Second, a subsequent study might explore the two constructs of organizational culture 
and knowledge transfer in a qualitative study, to confirm the link hypothesized in this 
research between the constructs measured and the actual constructs of interest.  Such a 
study might also revisit the constructs of Bureaucratic and Competition/Confrontation to 
establish a stronger sense of their correlations to knowledge transfer, as well as searching 
for a proper relationship between organizational culture and the construct of Partner 
Similarity.  Third, a subsequent study might wish to revisit the assumptions made in this 
paper as to how different organizational cultures account for the two organizational 
economic costs:  agency costs and transaction costs.  Fourth, a subsequent study might 
attempt to manipulate one of the two constructs of organizational culture and knowledge 
transfer in an attempt to show any causal relationship that may exist between the 
constructs.  Fifth, a subsequent study might attempt to measure different types of 
squadrons, such as squadrons identifying themselves as primarily similar and those 
identifying themselves as primarily dissimilar, to see whether there are differences 
between them in organizational culture and knowledge transfer.  Sixth, a subsequent 
study might attempt to investigate whether the Air Force as an organization exhibits an 
overall type of organizational culture and general trend as to knowledge transfer 
indicators.  Finally, once the above studies are accomplished, a final step in this vein of 
research might attempt to give the practitioner important advice about how to treat the 
constructs of organizational culture and knowledge transfer with respect to each other in 




This research indicates a correlation exists between some types of organizational 
culture and some factors influencing knowledge transfer.  In doing so, it bridges the gap 
between the somewhat ethereal and group-centered theory of organizational culture and 
the equally ethereal, but individually centered theory of knowledge transfer—clearing up 
an apparent contradiction between the two theories.   
In one sense, this research appears to confirm what both academics and 
practitioners alike have stated about the importance of considering organizational culture 
when implementing knowledge management projects.  In another sense, the research asks 
new questions, such as, “if organizational culture and knowledge transfer are correlated, 
what can a manager do to make sure organizational culture is taken into account when 
proposing a knowledge management project?”  Indeed, the answer to this question might 
prove as important to the academic as to the practitioner. 
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Appendix A:  Survey Instrument 
 
The Squadron Culture Questionnaire (SCQ) 
 
Explanation: 
Welcome to the SCQ.  This survey is being conducted for two reasons: (1) to measure 
unit culture in the Air Force and determine how culture may affect a unit's capability to 
transfer knowledge internally, in concert with research sponsored by the Air Force Chief 
Information Officer's Information & Knowledge Management Division and (2) to fulfill a 
research requirement for completion of a student thesis through the Air Force Institute of 
Technology, Department of Engineering and Management.  Your responses will be 
combined with the responses of other members of your organization and aggregated with 
other similar organizations to determine how organizations in your mission area compare 
to organizations in other mission areas. 
 This research is approved by the Air Force Survey Branch with survey control 
number USAF SCN 02-013 which expires 31 May 2002.  
Several steps have been taken to protect your anonymity.  First, you will not be asked to 
provide your name at any time.  Second, your questionnaire responses will be entered 
directly into a database programmed such that there is no way of determining from whom 
the information is being sent.  Finally, your organization's name is used only to fit each 
response with an organization type, and will not be used in any reports generated.  
Instructions:  
• The SCQ should take 10-15 minutes to complete, and consists of three areas:  
• Area 1:  Choose your squadron from the drop-down box.  
• Area 2:  Indicate your level of agreement with the 63 short statements, (from 
Completely Disagree to Completely Agree).  Answer on behalf of your squadron (or 
equivalent unit).  You may use the mouse to select the circle representing your answer 
to each item, or tab between items and use the "up" arrow to select the first circle, and 
"down" to select/move through the remaining 4 circles.  
• Area 3:  Demographic information.  Your answers to these four questions are used only 
to assess the validity of the overall results.  
• Finally, you are given the option to provide feedback (in about 50 words or less) to the 
authors of this survey.  We welcome your comments and any suggestions for 
improvement.  
• Each item only allows one answer, and each of the 63 items must be answered.  
• The term "section" refers to your individual work unit below the squadron level (e.g., 
flight, element, or section, as applicable).  
• Press The link to Survey page 1 below to begin:  
Survey Page 1 
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The SCQ  
 
Squadron You Are Currently Assigned to:  
Please indicate your level of agreement with the 
statements below.  Answer on behalf of your squadron 
















1. My squadron . . . is comprised of people with similar 
trade skills   
     
2. In my squadron . . . people have a "meeting of the 
minds" to ask questions and give explanations  
     
3. In my squadron . . . Every single section is essential to 
mission accomplishment  
     
4. In my squadron . . . change is blocked       
5. In my squadron . . . individuals share similar career 
fields   
     
6. In my squadron . . . rewards are dependent on 
performance  
     
7. In my squadron . . . people who wish to advance are 
supported by their superiors  
     
8. In my squadron . . . objectives are clear       
9. In my squadron . . . people rely on other people to 
answer questions   
     
10. My squadron is . . . task-oriented       
11. In my squadron . . . coworkers regularly ask each other 
for assistance  
     
12. In my squadron . . . decision-making is centralized       
13. In my squadron . . . the chain of command is the most 
important  
     
14. In my squadron . . . in wartime, the entire unit deploys        
15. In my squadron . . . managers express concern about 
employees’ personal problems  
     
16. In my squadron . . . management practices allow 
freedom in work  
     
17. In my squadron . . . management specifies the targets 
to be attained  
     
18. In my squadron . . . cautious, incremental improvement 
is stressed  
     
19. My squadron . . . encourages participation from all 
members  
     
20. In my squadron . . . people learn how to perform tasks 
by asking other people  
     
21. My squadron . . . changes its priorities to "keep the 
peace"  
     
22. In my squadron . . . people rely on documents to 
answer questions   
     
23. In my squadron . . . members oppose each other       
24. In my squadron . . . new ideas about work organization 
are encouraged  
     
25. In my squadron . . . there are hard criteria against which 
job performance is measured  
     
26. In my squadron . . . every section is located in close 
physical proximity to every other section  
     
 
102 
27. In my squadron . . . every section serves the same 
customer  
     
28. In my squadron . . . the typical member takes initiative       
29. In my squadron . . . constructive criticism is accepted       
30. In my squadron . . . employees seem aware of their role 
in the organization  
     
31. In my squadron . . . trade-based affiliations are 
important  
     
32. My squadron is . . . comfortable in unfamiliar situations        
33. In my squadron . . . every section shares a singular 
focus  
     
34. In my squadron . . . problems are noticed and dealt with 
immediately  
     
35. In my squadron . . . people with personal problems are 
helped  
     
36. My squadron . . . passes the blame for failure       
37. My squadron . . . does a good job of assessing its 
shortcomings  
     
38. In my squadron . . . people have an informal style of 
dealing with each other  
     
39. In my squadron . . . there are winners and losers        
40. My squadron . . . searches for new opportunities in the 
external environment  
     
41. In my squadron . . . people seem to know how their role 
fits into the overall mission  
     
42. In my squadron . . . excellence is demanded       
43. In my squadron . . . everyone is similar       
44. My squadron . . . makes the best use of the employee 
skills to develop better products/services  
     
45. In my squadron . . . individual innovation is rewarded       
46. In my squadron . . . competitiveness between sections 
is measured  
     
47. In my squadron . . . people seem to know each other's 
roles   
     
48. In my squadron . . . people are willing to learn new 
things  
     
49. My squadron . . . is very knowledgeable about skills 
required for our job, compared to the best of our peers   
     
50. In my squadron . . . criticism is not well-taken       
51. My squadron . . . rewards desired behavior       
52. In my squadron . . . members play "devil's advocate" to 
each other  
     
53. In my squadron . . . individuals share similar interests        
54. In my squadron . . . cooperation is the most important       
55. In my squadron . . . mistakes are tolerated       
56. In my squadron . . . individual appraisal is directly 
related to the attainment of goals   
     
57. In my squadron . . . people know where to go to resolve 
task-specific questions outside their area of expertise  
     
58. In my squadron . . . people are willing to share what 
they know   
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59. In my squadron . . . the typical member is forceful with 
opinions  
     
60. In my squadron . . . conflict is avoided at all costs        
61. In my squadron . . . members argue about the best 
solution  
     
62. My squadron . . . never settles for less than the 
absolute best solution  
     
63. In my squadron . . . performance measurement is 
common  
     
64. In my squadron . . . goals are often unachievable       
65. In my squadron . . . people tend to pull in many different 
directions  
     
66. In my squadron . . . communication is two-way        
67. In my squadron . . . members know where to go for help      
68. In my squadron . . . personal contacts are important       
69. In my squadron . . . people from functionally diverse 
sections know each other  
     
70. In my squadron . . . personal responsibility is stressed       
71. In my squadron . . . individuals know enough about their 
own abilities to ask for assistance when they require it  
     
72. My squadron is . . . extremely conservative       
73. In my squadron . . . managers seem aware of the skill 
level of their employees   
     
74. In my squadron . . . over time, individuals share similar 
experiences  
     
75. My squadron . . . expends resources to encourage 
employees to share what they know   
     
76. In my squadron . . . junior members learn from senior 
members  
     
77. In my squadron . . . the typical member is direct       
78. My squadron is . . . "win-lose" oriented       
79. In my squadron . . . mentorship is important       
80. In my squadron . . . it is clear how performance will be 
evaluated  
     
81. My squadron . . . respects the opinions of senior 
members  
     
82. In my squadron . . . the typical member pleases others       
83. In my squadron . . . person-to-person discussions are 
common  
     
84. In my squadron . . . the tried and true methods are 
questioned  
     
85. In my squadron . . . people are open to criticism       
86. In my squadron . . . failure is accepted       
87. In my squadron . . . overall, the sections perform a 
singular functional mission  
     
88. In my squadron . . . people work within the constraints 
of their job description  
     
89. In my squadron . . . section goals are in-line with the 
organization's mission and goals   
     
90. In my squadron . . . competition is encouraged or 
rewarded  





Highest Level of Schooling Attained:  
Age:  
Gender:  




Your results are now recorded.  
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATON!  
 
Explanation of Appendix A 
1. Radio buttons provided for selection are not shown; one radio button was provided 
per question for each choice (strongly disagree, disagree, indifferent, agree, strongly 
agree). 
2. The construct measured for each question is listed in Appendix B, as is the reliability 
analysis for each construct.  Questions were removed as noted in appendix B to 
increase inter-question reliability. 
3. The factor analysis for each question/construct is listed in Appendix C. 
 
105 
Appendix B:  Pilot Test Reliability Data 
Reliability Analysis for Openness to Change/Innovation (I) Questions  
Note:  Indicates Question Removed 
       
Reliability Coefficients: 
 
First Run: N of Cases = 66.0 N of Items = 13 Alpha = .8853 




Question Number Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 




Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
First Run: 
Q07 38.2576 58.5019 .5803 .8766 
Q15 38.5000 56.1308 .6293 .8738 
Q16 38.4545 57.1748 .6234 .8742 
Q24 38.5758 59.3557 .5250 .8792 
Q28 38.8485 54.8690 .7136 .8690 
Q29 38.7576 56.0942 .6744 .8714 
Q32 38.8333 59.4026 .4652 .8822 
Q35 38.3939 57.7193 .5738 .8768 
Q40 38.6970 59.2298 .5675 .8774 
Q44 38.6818 54.7741 .7682 .8663 
Q55 39.0152 60.7228 .3183 .8909 
Q85 38.9545 55.3671 .7415 .8679 
Q86 39.6667 62.1333 .2875 .8903 
Last Run: 
Q07 29.8636 41.1965 .6068 .8912 
Q15 30.1061 39.0501 .6640 .8876 
Q16 30.0606 40.3963 .6196 .8904 
Q24 30.1818 42.1818 .5260 .8959 
Q28 30.4545 38.4979 .7073 .8845 
Q29 30.3636 39.3427 .6839 .8861 
Q35 30.0000 40.4923 .6010 .8917 
Q40 30.3030 42.1221 .5651 .8937 
Q44 30.2879 38.2082 .7821 .8793 
Q85 30.5606 39.2655 .7044 .8848 
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Reliability Analysis for Task-Oriented Organizational Growth (T) Questions  
Note:  Indicates Question Removed 
       
Reliability Coefficients: 
 
First Run: N of Cases = 66.0 N of Items = 10 Alpha = .8866 




Question Number Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 




Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
First Run: 
Q06 30.6061 32.8886 .7420 .8660 
Q08 30.2879 35.2235 .5888 .8782 
Q10 30.0000 35.5077 .6851 .8713 
Q17 30.1061 36.5578 .5564 .8799 
Q18 30.4242 36.3096 .6832 .8724 
Q25 30.5000 35.4538 .6553 .8731 
Q46 30.6212 38.9774 .3123 .8964 
Q56 30.4394 35.1117 .7084 .8695 
Q63 30.3636 36.5427 .6113 .8764 
Q80 30.4697 33.7914 .7015 .8693 
Last Run: 
Q06 27.4697 29.0529 .7359 .8787 
Q08 27.1515 30.8690 .6188 .8885 
Q10 26.8636 31.4734 .6834 .8832 
Q17 26.9697 32.6145 .5380 .8938 
Q18 27.2879 32.2082 .6843 .8840 
Q25 27.3636 31.4042 .6553 .8851 
Q56 27.3030 31.1683 .6992 .8819 
Q63 27.2273 32.4245 .6121 .8884 
Q80 27.3333 29.5487 .7302 .8790 
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Reliability Analysis for Bureaucratic (B) Questions  
Note:  Indicates Question Removed 
       
Reliability Coefficients: 
 
First Run: N of Cases = 66.0 N of Items = 13 Alpha = .2546 




Question Number Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 




Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
First Run: 
Q04 35.8636 13.7503 .2691 .1539 
Q12 35.2576 13.9172 .1852 .1864 
Q13 34.7576 16.3711 -.0707 .2989 
Q21 35.5303 13.1452 .3062 .1261 
Q36 35.9091 14.6993 .1283 .2175 
Q38 35.6667 16.3179 -.0490 .2864 
Q60 35.6818 12.8357 .3663 .0978 
Q70 36.3182 17.8510 -.2501 .3630 
Q72 35.2424 15.1096 .1102 .2272 
Q77 35.7576 17.6019 -.2206 .3466 
Q82 35.3182 15.6972 .0291 .2588 
Q84 35.5152 17.0536 -.1487 .3206 
Q88 35.3636 12.6657 .3349 .1021 
Last Run: 
Q04 12.2273 8.8245 .3120 .5912 
Q12 11.6212 8.6389 .2667 .6171 
Q21 11.8939 7.6655 .4692 .5111 
Q60 12.0455 8.3517 .3588 .5693 
Q88 11.7273 7.4629 .4576 .5149 
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Reliability Analysis for Competition/Confrontation (C) Questions  
Note:  Indicates Question Removed 
       
Reliability Coefficients: 
 
First Run: N of Cases = 66.0 N of Items = 11 Alpha = .5908 




Question Number Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 




Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
First Run: 
Q23 31.0303 15.4452 .3857 .5332 
Q42 30.0909 18.7916 .0597 .6044 
Q50 31.0152 16.4459 .3489 .5467 
Q52 30.8485 17.0228 .2920 .5603 
Q54 31.3788 18.7312 .0214 .6195 
Q59 31.0152 15.2152 .5113 .5055 
Q61 30.7879 15.4005 .4499 .5188 
Q62 30.6515 18.9075 -.0209 .6348 
Q64 31.3939 16.1809 .4102 .5338 
Q78 30.8788 16.8159 .2902 .5600 
Q90 30.4545 18.0979 .1399 .5914 
Last Run: 
Q23 14.6818 8.6818 .5306 .6529 
Q50 14.6667 10.2564 .3589 .7055 
Q59 14.6667 9.8564 .4109 .6912 
Q61 14.4394 9.0193 .5395 .6508 
Q64 15.0455 9.8902 .4560 .6785 
Q78 14.5303 9.9760 .4079 .6918 
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Reliability Analysis for Relational Channels (R) Questions  
Note:  Indicates Question Removed 
       
Reliability Coefficients: 
 
First Run: N of Cases = 66.0 N of Items = 10 Alpha = .7139 




Question Number Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 




Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
First Run: 
Q02 29.9091 18.5147 .4877 .6703 
Q09 29.7879 24.3235 -.1356 .7623 
Q20 29.7273 20.3245 .3429 .6966 
Q22 30.7424 24.5634 -.1639 .7662 
Q31 30.0303 20.5221 .3370 .6974 
Q66 30.0758 17.3942 .5491 .6561 
Q68 29.4697 19.3298 .5427 .6666 
Q76 29.6364 18.2657 .5719 .6559 
Q79 29.7273 17.5245 .6470 .6400 
Q83 29.5303 19.0221 .6139 .6569 
Last Run: 
Q02 17.4697 12.5606 .5623 .8006 
Q66 17.6364 12.3580 .5095 .8169 
Q68 17.0303 13.9375 .5115 .8098 
Q76 17.1970 12.1298 .6963 .7708 
Q79 17.2879 12.0235 .6838 .7730 
Q83 17.0909 13.4993 .6174 .7918 
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Reliability Analysis for Partner Similarity (S) Questions  
Note:  Indicates Question Removed 
       
Reliability Coefficients: 
 
First Run: N of Cases = 66.0 N of Items = 10 Alpha = .8358 




Question Number Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 




Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
First Run: 
Q01 26.2273 35.7476 .6245 .8111 
Q03 25.4697 40.5914 .3311 .8367 
Q05 26.4697 37.3914 .4841 .8250 
Q14 27.7879 39.2466 .4045 .8315 
Q26 27.2424 35.6019 .5696 .8165 
Q27 27.4091 34.3685 .4997 .8289 
Q43 27.0303 36.1837 .5919 .8144 
Q53 26.7121 37.6235 .5958 .8160 
Q74 26.3485 36.5075 .6666 .8091 
Q87 26.3030 36.8298 .5675 .8170 
Last Run: 
Q01 22.0303 32.2145 .5963 .8143 
Q05 22.2727 33.8322 .4510 .8301 
Q14 23.5909 34.8916 .4358 .8308 
Q26 23.0455 31.4594 .5954 .8142 
Q27 23.2121 30.3235 .5172 .8288 
Q43 22.8333 32.3872 .5856 .8155 
Q53 22.5152 33.8536 .5785 .8181 
Q74 22.1515 32.6536 .6647 .8091 
Q87 22.1061 32.9270 .5678 .8177 
 
111 
Reliability Analysis for Organizational Self-Knowledge (K) Questions  
Note:  Indicates Question Removed 
       
Reliability Coefficients: 
 
First Run: N of Cases = 66.0 N of Items = 12 Alpha = .9149 




Question Number Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 




Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Last Run: 
Q11 37.5000 56.5615 .4810 .9148 
Q30 37.6818 52.4357 .7598 .9033 
Q34 37.9545 51.3671 .6974 .9060 
Q37 37.8485 52.3767 .7029 .9057 
Q41 37.7121 52.7005 .7382 .9043 
Q47 37.9545 52.8441 .6747 .9070 
Q49 37.8939 51.3886 .6955 .9061 
Q57 37.6515 52.7228 .7032 .9057 
Q67 37.5152 54.8690 .6486 .9085 
Q69 37.9848 53.9228 .5296 .9142 
Q71 37.6061 55.2578 .6011 .9103 
Q73 37.5303 52.8068 .6623 .9075 
Last Run: 
Q30 27.2727 32.9399 .7643 .8970 
Q34 27.5455 31.8825 .7177 .9002 
Q37 27.4394 33.0193 .6919 .9018 
Q41 27.3030 33.3221 .7234 .8998 
Q47 27.5455 33.3594 .6665 .9036 
Q49 27.4848 32.0998 .6966 .9019 
Q57 27.2424 33.0788 .7151 .9002 
Q67 27.1061 34.9578 .6432 .9054 
Q73 27.1212 33.3389 .6527 .9046 
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Reliability Analysis for Divergence of Interests (D) Questions  
Note:  Indicates Question Removed 
       
Reliability Coefficients: 
 
First Run: N of Cases = 66.0 N of Items = 11 Alpha = .6373 




Question Number Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 




Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
First Run: 
Q19 34.2727 20.1399 .3665 .6000 
Q33 35.0758 19.8249 .3827 .5960 
Q39 34.7727 27.0091 -.3708 .7322 
Q45 34.6818 18.1587 .5481 .5564 
Q48 34.7273 18.8476 .5202 .5671 
Q51 34.6970 18.8914 .5367 .5651 
Q58 34.3939 18.6424 .6026 .5538 
Q65 34.7424 29.0557 -.5381 .7616 
Q75 34.9848 18.4767 .6004 .5520 
Q81 34.4242 18.0634 .5175 .5613 
Q89 34.2879 20.7620 .5275 .5879 
Last Run: 
Q19 24.5455 22.6517 .4133 .8431 
Q45 24.9545 19.7671 .6875 .8077 
Q48 25.0000 21.1692 .5808 .8225 
Q51 24.9697 20.7991 .6531 .8133 
Q58 24.6667 21.0256 .6569 .8133 
Q75 25.2576 21.1788 .6101 .8188 
Q81 24.6970 20.7068 .5311 .8311 




Appendix C:  Pilot Test Factor Analysis—Rotated Component Matrix 
Q# 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
B (4) -.361-.352.496   
B (12) .854   
B (13) .643   
B (21) -.458  
B (36) -.704   
B (38) -.549 -.356   
B (60) .843   
B (70) -.525   
B (72)   .872
B (77) -.402  -.655  
B (82)   
B (84) -.772   
B (88) .512  .419  
C (23) -.388    
C (42) .376 .576  .402   
C (50)  -.802   
C (52)  -.825   
C (54) -.451    
C (59)  .809   
C (61)  .694   
C (62) .387  -.353  .422  
C (64) -.357 .353-.381 -.445  
C (78)  .475.368   
C (90) .439 .476    
D (19) -.800   
D (33) -.355  -.467  
D (39)   .613
D (45) -.433-.403   
D (48) -.700   
D (51) -.396   -.498
D (58) -.475   
D (65) .381   
D (75) -.424   
D (81) -.694   
D (89) -.765   
I (7) .534   
I (15) .450 .520    
I (16) .397 .357 .374    
I (24) .385 .391    
I (28) .552    
I (29) .470 .368   
I (32) .778    
I (35) .709    
I (40) .392 .356 .427    
I (44) .457 .526    
I (55) .812    
I (85) .468    
I (86) .628    
K (11) .381  .439    
K (30) .656 .370     
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K (34) .584     
K (37) .687    
K (41) .453  .365   
K (47) .426     
K (49) .452     
K (57) .371  .497    
K (67) .441 .433     
K (69)  .754    
K (71) .384 .481     
K (73) .489 .382 .384    
R (2) .428 .390   
R (9)  .765  
R (20) .371   
R (22)  -.817  
R (31) .521 .470   
R (66) .373 .497  .377  
R (68) .518 .452   
R (76) .363 .391  .441  
R (79) .381   
R (83) .702   
S (1) .673   
S (3) .722   
S (5) .765   
S (14) .360  .679  
S (26) .652   
S (27) .818   
S (43) .607   
S (53) .457   
S (74) .420  .519  
S (87) .484  .418  
T (6) .672    
T (8)  .415   
T (10) .402    
T (17) .432 .514    
T (18) .416    
T (25) .626 .403  .374  
T (46) .531    
T (56) .526 .457    
T (63) .358 .427    
T (80) .631 .357 .375    
 
Note:  Indicates Question Removed 
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Explanation of Appendix C: 
1. The constructs abbreviations are defined as follows: 
I:  Openness to Change/Innovation 
T:  Task-Oriented Organizational Growth 
B:  Bureaucratic 
C:  Competition/Confrontation 
R:  Relational Channels 
S:  Partner Similarity 
K:  Organizational Self-Knowledge 
D:  Divergence of Interests 
2. In parenthesis next to each construct abbreviation is the number of the question. 
3. Loadings are shown with boxes.  In some cases, a group of questions loaded on more 
than one factor. 
4. Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
5. Rotation Method:  Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  Rotation converged in 49 
iterations.   
6. Cutoff for factor loadings:  .35.  (Note, this partially or completely eliminated the 
loadings for some factors and questions.) 
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Air Base Sq 1 91 91 6 85 35 89.27% 
Air Base Sq A2 238 211 203 35 0  
Air Mobility Sq 1 123 123 122 1 1  
Air Mobility Sq 2 315 223 13 302 56 90.06% 
Air Refueling Sq 2 84 84 5 79 17  
Airlift Sq 1 403 232 41 362 30 85.60% 
Airlift Sq 2 94 94 8 86 15  
Airlift Sq A4 232 210 52 180 33 87.02% 
Airlift Sq A5 202 202 17 185 26 85.01% 
Civil Engineering Sq 1 256 215 66 190 33 86.95% 
Civil Engineering Sq 3 313 223 80 233 20 82.38% 
Civil Engineering Sq A5 333 225 66 267 53 89.87% 
Communications Sq 1 355 228 28 327 48 89.02% 
Communications Sq 2 250 214 18 232 63 91.14% 
Communications Sq A3 126 126 12 114 43 90.06% 
Communications Sq A4 376 230 14 362 78 91.74% 
Communications Sq A5 108 108 16 92 24 85.49% 
Communications Sq A6 228 209 36 192 56 90.73% 
Equipment Maintenance Sq 1 564 242 31 533 43 87.96% 
Fighter Sq 1 303 222 27 276 48 89.19% 
Fighter Sq 2 271 217 125 146 9  
Fighter Sq 3 228 209 123 105 57 92.60% 
Fighter Sq A4 298 221 68 230 40 88.15% 
Fighter Sq A5 244 213 29 215 64 91.36% 
Fighter Sq A6 317 224 43 274 32 86.31% 
Fighter Sq A7 238 211 140 98 32 88.01% 
Fighter Sq A8 289 220 70 219 25 84.48% 
Fighter Sq A9 328 225 24 304 57 90.16% 
Intelligence Sq 1 339 226 226 113 15  
Intelligence Sq A3 315 223 28 287 69 91.36% 
Logistics Support Sq 1 105 105 5 100 30 87.37% 
Logistics Support Sq A3 93 93 6 87 26 86.41% 
Maintenance Sq 1 529 240 78 451 66 90.64% 
Maintenance Sq 2 491 238 31 460 48 88.75% 
Medical Operations Sq A4 128 128 16 112 40 89.53% 
Medical Operations Sq A5 202 202 13 189 34 87.19% 
Medical Support Sq A7 172 172 44 128 25 85.19% 
Mission Support Sq 1 86 86 10 76 17  
Operations Support Sq 1 184 184 28 156 36 87.94% 
Operations Support Sq 3 107 107 16 91 39 89.99% 
Operations Support Sq 4 142 142 8 134 65 92.65% 
Operations Support Sq 5 167 167 11 156 44 89.46% 
Security Forces Sq 1 149 149 68 81 24 85.83% 
Security Forces Sq A3 214 206 170 44 25  
Security Forces Sq A5 85 85 18 67 11  
Space Operations Sq A3 171 171 15 156 37 88.15% 
Special Operations Sq 1 163 163 26 137 29 86.39% 
Supply Sq 1 127 127 17 110 47 90.88% 
Supply Sq A2 156 156 27 129 41 89.35% 
Transportation Sq 1 149 149 29 120 24 84.92% 
Transportation Sq 2 151 151 41 110 27 86.19% 




Explanation of Appendix D: 
1.  The number of surveys sent was based on the smaller of either the number of 
personnel listed in each squadron times four or the number of personnel listed in each 
squadron. 
2.  The effective size of a squadron was based on the number of personnel listed in each 
squadron minus the number of rejected e-mails.  In any case where this difference left 
an effective size of fewer than 40, the squadron’s results were eliminated from further 
analysis (indicated by a dash “--”). 
3.  Statistical power was calculated using Equation 2, and based on the effective squadron 
size.  This mitigated the effects of the rejected e-mails, which might have been caused 
by personnel turnover or an outdated Air Force personnel system listing. 
4.  Squadrons listed in boldface met the statistical power required (88%) and were 
included in the squadron analysis. 
5.  The squadron listed in italics was used for the pilot study, and was therefore not 
included in either the squadron analysis or the individual perception analysis. 
6.  Statistical power for Squadrons with fewer than 10 responses and an effective size of 
less than 40 was not calculated, and those squadrons were eliminated from further 
consideration in the squadron analysis. 
7.  Individual responses from all squadrons except the squadron listed in italics were used 
for the individual perception analysis. 
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Appendix E:  Squadron Average Responses for Each Construct 
SQUADRON ?    VARIABLE ?  I T B C R S K D 
Air Base Sq 1 2.697 2.632 2.914 3.157 2.810 2.502 2.660 3.257 
Air Base Sq A2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Air Mobility Sq 1 3.200 2.667 2.600 3.500 2.667 2.333 2.667 3.750 
Air Mobility Sq 2 3.202 3.361 2.732 2.854 3.378 2.990 3.494 2.522 
Air Refueling Sq 2 3.412 3.379 2.882 2.882 3.529 3.458 3.654 2.412 
Airlift Sq 1 3.627 3.589 2.820 2.872 3.811 3.544 3.767 2.196 
Airlift Sq 2 3.100 3.363 2.787 3.067 3.111 2.948 3.237 2.767 
Airlift Sq A4 3.667 3.697 2.776 2.662 3.909 3.350 3.835 2.095 
Airlift Sq A5 3.250 3.355 2.869 2.891 3.494 3.239 3.350 2.481 
Civil Engineering Sq 1 3.124 3.279 3.030 3.010 3.288 3.098 3.333 2.712 
Civil Engineering Sq 3 3.185 3.267 3.150 2.967 3.617 2.972 3.367 2.606 
Civil Engineering Sq A5 3.219 3.344 2.864 3.019 3.478 2.851 3.296 2.594 
Communications Sq 1 3.306 3.211 2.813 2.861 3.444 2.553 3.255 2.589 
Communications Sq 2 3.430 3.444 2.921 2.802 3.566 2.734 3.409 2.421 
Communications Sq A3 3.319 3.183 3.056 2.934 3.415 2.840 3.253 2.532 
Communications Sq A4 3.504 3.433 2.744 2.808 3.575 2.731 3.446 2.370 
Communications Sq A5 3.667 3.713 2.917 2.708 3.882 2.769 3.759 2.161 
Communications Sq A6 3.182 3.143 2.850 2.878 3.414 2.817 3.111 2.634 
Equipment Maintenance Sq 1 3.047 3.217 2.902 3.112 3.229 2.711 3.214 2.584 
Fighter Sq 1 3.113 3.329 2.896 3.163 3.424 3.280 3.301 2.688 
Fighter Sq 2 3.233 3.432 2.711 3.259 3.278 3.309 3.296 2.681 
Fighter Sq 3 3.218 3.470 3.154 3.175 3.430 3.458 3.616 2.476 
Fighter Sq A4 3.568 3.594 2.780 2.979 3.633 3.494 3.717 2.281 
Fighter Sq A5 2.944 3.179 2.844 3.318 3.242 3.377 3.354 2.771 
Fighter Sq A6 2.938 3.215 2.875 2.984 3.344 3.243 3.323 2.742 
Fighter Sq A7 3.553 3.639 2.750 2.771 3.729 3.441 3.747 2.223 
Fighter Sq A8 3.468 3.671 2.888 2.880 3.733 3.298 3.760 2.205 
Fighter Sq A9 3.154 3.296 2.723 3.135 3.404 3.390 3.329 2.544 
Intelligence Sq 1 3.480 3.474 2.893 2.789 3.589 3.141 3.281 2.467 
Intelligence Sq A3 3.703 3.581 2.733 2.795 3.877 2.908 3.684 2.192 
Logistics Support Sq 1 3.337 3.189 2.960 2.733 3.472 2.485 3.359 2.617 
Logistics Support Sq A3 3.304 3.248 2.977 2.878 3.276 2.714 3.103 2.707 
Maintenance Sq 1 3.358 3.402 2.976 2.934 3.457 2.830 3.418 2.453 
Maintenance Sq 2 3.319 3.442 2.900 2.858 3.524 3.074 3.435 2.380 
Medical Operations Sq A4 3.255 3.122 2.840 2.904 3.396 2.892 3.203 2.609 
Medical Operations Sq A5 3.150 3.173 2.976 3.034 3.382 2.824 3.222 2.570 
Medical Support Sq A7 3.520 3.444 2.848 2.527 3.593 2.711 3.489 2.335 
Mission Support Sq 1 3.035 3.346 3.118 3.108 3.353 3.268 3.209 2.640 
Operations Support Sq 1 3.581 3.451 2.622 2.653 3.736 2.142 3.522 2.260 
Operations Support Sq 3 3.397 3.387 3.082 2.803 3.521 3.006 3.578 2.407 
Operations Support Sq 4 3.417 3.345 2.871 2.923 3.492 2.340 3.412 2.538 
Operations Support Sq 5 3.089 3.051 2.755 3.140 3.345 2.639 3.101 2.713 
Security Forces Sq 1 2.929 3.181 2.775 3.264 3.382 2.995 3.120 2.734 
Security Forces Sq A3 3.124 3.262 2.816 3.027 3.340 2.929 3.204 2.605 
Security Forces Sq A5 2.445 2.626 2.327 3.167 2.727 2.646 2.556 3.375 
Space Operations Sq A3 3.354 3.526 2.957 2.842 3.491 3.150 3.474 2.361 
Special Operations Sq 1 3.521 3.563 2.779 2.960 3.661 3.249 3.705 2.384 
Supply Sq 1 3.472 3.447 2.991 2.897 3.532 2.967 3.506 2.391 
Supply Sq A2 3.354 3.366 2.966 2.854 3.520 2.780 3.379 2.527 
Transportation Sq 1 3.067 3.120 2.808 3.056 3.313 2.866 3.051 2.880 
Transportation Sq 2 3.200 3.407 3.037 3.062 3.327 2.564 3.284 2.616 
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Explanation of Appendix E: 
1.  The constructs abbreviations are defined as follows: 
I:  Openness to Change/Innovation 
T:  Task-Oriented Organizational Growth 
B:  Bureaucratic 
C:  Competition/Confrontation 
R:  Relational Channels 
S:  Partner Similarity 
K:  Organizational Self-Knowledge 
D:  Divergence of Interests 
2.  Squadron mean scores were calculated first for each individual for each construct, by 
adding the Likert-type responses for each question measuring a construct, then 
dividing by the total questions measuring that construct.  (For example, to measure an 
individual’s mean score for the construct “Openness to Change/Innovation,” the 
Likert-type responses were added for questions 7, 15, 16, 24, 28, 29, 35, 40, 44, and 
85, then divided by 10.)  Next, each individual response for each construct was added 
with the other individual responses for the squadron, and divided by the total number 
of personnel in their squadron who completed the survey (there were no incomplete 
surveys). 
3.  Individual perception mean scores were calculated the same as above for each 
construct.  Next, each individual’s response for each construct was added with the 
other individual responses, and divided by the total number of personnel who 
completed the survey. 
4.  Squadrons listed in boldface met the statistical power required (88%) and were 
included in the squadron analysis. 
5.  The squadron listed in italics was used for the pilot study, and was therefore not 
included in either the squadron analysis or the individual perception analysis. 
6.  A dash “--”  indicates no responses were received. 
6.  Statistical power for Squadrons with fewer than 10 responses and an effective size of 
less than 40 was not calculated, and those squadrons were eliminated from further 
consideration in the squadron analysis. 
7.  Individual responses from all squadrons except the squadron listed in italics were used 
for the individual perception analysis. 
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Appendix F:  Final Reliability Analysis for Each Construct Measured 
Openness to Change/Innovation (I) N of Cases = 1857 N of Items = 10 Alpha = .9047 
Task-Oriented Organizational Growth (T) N of Cases = 1857 N of Items = 9 Alpha = .8589 
Bureaucratic (B) N of Cases = 1857 N of Items = 5 Alpha = .3575 
Competition/Confrontation (C) N of Cases = 1857 N of Items = 6 Alpha = .6422 
Relational Channels (R) N of Cases = 1857 N of Items = 6 Alpha = .8024 
Partner Similarity (S) N of Cases = 1857 N of Items = 9 Alpha = .7553 
Organizational Self-Knowledge (K) N of Cases = 1857 N of Items = 9 Alpha = .8954 
Divergence of Interests (D) N of Cases = 1857 N of Items = 8 Alpha = .8521 
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Appendix G:  Final Factor Analysis—Rotated Component Matrix 
Variable/# 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
B (12)          .754 
B (21)       .624    
B (4) -.544        .392  
B (60)       .683    
B (88)   .362        
C (23) -.475       .374   
C (50) -.535          
C (59)        .620   
C (61)        .727   
C (64)           
C (78)         .597  
D (19) -.597          
D (45) -.791          
D (48) -.468 -.552         
D (51) -.717          
D (58) -.429 -.462         
D (75) -.574          
D (81) -.558          
D (89) -.482  -.359        
I (15) .650          
I (16) .653          
I (24) .729          
I (28) .455 .515         
I (29) .684 .360         
I (35) .655          
I (40) .628          
I (44) .701          
I (7) .723          
I (85) .635 .378         
K (30) .489 .417 .436        
K (34) .623          
K (37 .684          
K (41) .454 .386 .498        
K (47) .375 .554         
K (49) .479 .397         
K (57)  .462    .376     
K (67) .519 .359    .371     
K (73) .584          
R (2) .631          
R (66) .735          
R (68)      .607     
R (76) .563     .366     
R (79) .648          
R (83) .538     .444     
S (1)    .849       
S (14)     .608      
S (26)     .702      
S (27)     .764      
S (43)       .436    
S (5)    .867       
S (53)  .396  .386       
S (74)    .377       
S (87)     .435      
T (10) .463  .354       .420 
T (17) .504  .438        
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T (18) .489  .368        
T (25) .439          
T (56) .653          
T (6) .731          
T (63) .604          
T (8) .595  .438        
T (80) .683          
 
Explanation of Appendix G: 
7. The constructs abbreviations are defined as follows: 
I:  Openness to Change/Innovation 
T:  Task-Oriented Organizational Growth 
B:  Bureaucratic 
C:  Competition/Confrontation 
R:  Relational Channels 
S:  Partner Similarity 
K:  Organizational Self-Knowledge 
D:  Divergence of Interests 
8. In parenthesis next to each construct abbreviation is the number of the question. 
9. Loadings are shown with boxes.  In some cases, a group of questions loaded on more 
than one factor. 
10. Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
11. Rotation Method:  Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  Rotation converged in 20 
iterations.   
12. Cutoff for factor loadings:  .35.  (Note, this partially or completely eliminated the 
loadings for some factors and questions.) 
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Appendix H:  Example of Means Test for Male/Female Demographic 
One-way Analysis of Average Openness to Change/Innovation by Gender 
Means for One-way ANOVA 
Level Number Mean Std Error Lower 95% Upper 95% 
F 382 3.26099 0.03827 3.1859 3.3361 
M 1475 3.30827 0.01948 3.2701 3.3465 
Means Comparisons (Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly 
different) 
Dif=Mean[i]-Mean[j] M F  
M 0.000000 0.047276 Alpha=0.05 
F -0.04728 0.000000  
One-way Analysis of Average Task-Oriented Organizational Growth by Gender 
Means for One-way ANOVA 
Level Number Mean Std Error Lower 95% Upper 95% 
F 382 3.31618 0.03407 3.2494 3.3830 
M 1475 3.35594 0.01734 3.3219 3.3899 
Means Comparisons (Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly 
different) 
Dif=Mean[i]-Mean[j] M F  
M 0.000000 0.039769 Alpha=0.05 
F -0.03977 0.000000  
One-way Analysis of Average Bureaucratic by Gender 
Means for One-way ANOVA 
Level Number Mean Std Error Lower 95% Upper 95% 
F 382 2.83351 0.02809 2.7784 2.8886 
M 1475 2.88651 0.01430 2.8585 2.9145 
Means Comparisons (Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly 
different) 
Dif=Mean[i]-Mean[j] M F  
M 0.000000 0.053001 Alpha=0.05 
F -0.053 0.000000  
One-way Analysis of Average Competition/Confrontation by Gender 
Means for One-way ANOVA 
Level Number Mean Std Error Lower 95% Upper 95% 
F 382 2.91668 0.02986 2.8581 2.9752 
M 1475 2.95163 0.01520 2.9218 2.9814 
Means Comparisons (Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly 
different) 
Dif=Mean[i]-Mean[j] M F  
M 0.000000 0.034956 Alpha=0.05 




One-way Analysis of Average Relational Channels by Gender 
Means for One-way ANOVA 
Level Number Mean Std Error Lower 95% Upper 95% 
F 382 3.40925 0.03640 3.3379 3.4806 
M 1475 3.49412 0.01853 3.4578 3.5305 
Means Comparisons (Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly 
different) 
Dif=Mean[i]-Mean[j] M F  
M 0.000000 0.084871 Alpha=0.05 
F -0.08487 0.000000  
One-way Analysis of Average Partner Similarity by Gender 
Means for One-way ANOVA 
Level Number Mean Std Error Lower 95% Upper 95% 
F 382 2.85951 0.03372 2.7934 2.9256 
M 1475 2.97462 0.01716 2.9410 3.0083 
Means Comparisons (Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly 
different) 
Dif=Mean[i]-Mean[j] M F  
M 0.000000 0.115114 Alpha=0.05 
F -0.11511 0.000000  
One-way Analysis of Average Organizational Knowledge by Gender 
Means for One-way ANOVA 
Level Number Mean Std Error Lower 95% Upper 95% 
F 382 3.30109 0.03741 3.2277 3.3745 
M 1475 3.41516 0.01904 3.3778 3.4525 
Means Comparisons (Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly 
different) 
Dif=Mean[i]-Mean[j] M F  
M 0.000000 0.114066 Alpha=0.05 
F -0.11407 0.000000  
One-way Analysis of Average Divergence of Interests by Gender 
Means for One-way ANOVA 
Level Number Mean Std Error Lower 95% Upper 95% 
F 382 2.56577 0.03481 2.4975 2.6340 
M 1475 2.49958 0.01772 2.4648 2.5343 
Means Comparisons (Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly 
different) 
Dif=Mean[i]-Mean[j] F M  
F 0.000000 0.066196 Alpha=0.05 
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